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ABSTRACT 
World leaders and international and non-governmental organizations, have invested 
millions of private and government funds into bringing secular education into remote 
regions of Afghanistan and other parts of the world in hopes of combating terrorism.  
This is an insufficient solution to a problem of that faces all religious, economic, and 
social communities of the world.  Focusing on secular education alone without a larger 
political and economic reform brings a false sense of security because education without 
other inputs is not sufficient in combating terrorism.  A comparative analysis in this thesis 
illustrates that education by itself does not prevent terrorism. Other causal factors must be 
considered when addressing individuals who do commit terrorist acts. This thesis will use 
the cases of the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and eleven 
profiles of educated individuals who were involved in terrorist acts as counterexamples to 
the education-only theory.  It will also discuss present U.S. operations in Afghanistan that 
focus on education, and present proposals to improve the social and economic conditions 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................5 
B. HISTORICAL EXAMPLE:  SRI LANKA ....................................................6 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................9 
D. METHOD .......................................................................................................19 
II. SRI LANKA’S INDEPENDENCE, NATIONAL MOVEMENTS, THE 
LTTE, AND EDUCATION SYSTEM .....................................................................21 
A. THE END OF THE LTTE? ..........................................................................21 
B. THE SINHALESE VIEW OF POST-COLONIZATION ..........................22 
C. BUDDHIST EXTREMISM, SINHALESE LANGUAGE 
MOVEMENT, AND TAMIL MARGINALIZATION ...............................23 
D. BUDDHIST REVIVAL .................................................................................24 
1. Buddhist Theosophical Society in 1880 (Led by William Steel 
Olcott)..................................................................................................24 
2. General Election of 1947 (Emergence of the “Political Monk” 
in Sri Lanka) .......................................................................................25 
3. 1956 Elections and the Beginning of Tamil Oppression .................26 
4. 1958......................................................................................................27 
5. 1960s ....................................................................................................28 
6. 1970s ....................................................................................................28 
7. 1980s ....................................................................................................29 
8. 1990s ....................................................................................................30 
9. 2000 and Beyond ................................................................................31 
E. THE LTTE .....................................................................................................33 
F. SRI LANKA’S EDUCATION SYSTEM ......................................................39 
G. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................40 
III. TERRORIST EVENTS CARRIED OUT BY EDUCATED INDIVIDUALS ......43 
A. MOHAMED ATTA (9/11) ..............................................................................43 
B. FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBERS IN PALESTINE IN 2002–2003 ............46 
C. MUNICH OLYMPIC GAMES 1972 ...........................................................50 
D. THEODORE JOHN “TED” KACZYNSKI, “THE UNABOMBER” 
1978–1985........................................................................................................53 
E. TIMOTHY JAMES MCVEIGH, OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING, 
1995..................................................................................................................55 
F. OSAMA BIN LADEN....................................................................................57 
G. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................60 
IV. THE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN, 
POVERTY STATUS IN AFGHANISTAN, PRESENT CONFLICT 
SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN, AND TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN ...63 
A. USAID TO AFGHANISTAN ........................................................................64 
 viii 
B. POVERTY STATUS IN AFGHANISTAN .................................................67 
C. PRESENT CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN .............................................70 
D. TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN .............................................................75 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................76 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................77 
A. INSIGHTS ......................................................................................................77 
1. An Educated Country Does Not Mean It Is the Most Civilized 
Country ...............................................................................................77 
2. Isolating a Minority Will Lead to Conflict and Dire 
Consequences......................................................................................78 
3. Lack of Education Is Not the Lone Factor for Individuals 
Committing Terrorist Acts................................................................79 
B. WHAT REALLY NEEDS TO BE DONE IN AFGHANISTAN ...............79 
1. Make Basic Necessities for Survival the Priority, Not a Priority ..80 
2. Increase Vocational Training While, Improving the Education 
System .................................................................................................83 
3. Immediately Restructure Funding for Afghanistan .......................86 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................89 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................99 
 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. FY 2002–FY 2007 Obligation, in Millions of U.S. dollars, to Afghanistan 
by USAID ........................................................................................................65 
Figure 2. FY 2008–FY 2009 Budget, in Millions of U.S. dollars, to Afghanistan by 
USAID .............................................................................................................66 
Figure 3. Rising Intensity of the Fighting: 2005–2009 ...................................................71 
Figure 4. Rising Intensity of Fighting in 2009 ................................................................72 
Figure 5. Insurgent Influence and Capability by District: 2009 ......................................73 
Figure 6. Going South & Aiding the Taliban: Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends in 
Afghanistan 2002-2009 (at Province Level) (Source: Afghanistan Opium 
Surveys, 2002–2009 UNODC) ........................................................................73 
Figure 7. Taliban Dominates: Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009 (at 
Province Level) ................................................................................................74 
Figure 8. Fatalities Resulting from Selected Terrorist Incidents in Afghanistan   
(Source: RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents) .......................75 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. LTTE Suicide Attacks in the Context of the Sri Lankan War .........................35 
Table 2. Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Sri Lanka Since March 2000 .....................36 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS  
CAI Central Asia Institute 
CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CLTS Community Led-Total Sanitation 
CRS Congressional Research Service  
EPRLF Eelam People’s Revolutionary Front 
ESDFP Education Sector Development Framework and Program  
ESDP Education Sector Development Project  
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
F.B.I. Federal Bureau of Investigation 
IDF Israeli Defense Forces  
IMF International Monetary Fund 
JHU Jathika Hela Urumaya, or National Heritage Party 
JVP Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, or Peoples Liberation Front 
KKK Ku Klux Klan 
LCEP-2 Learning for Community Empowerment Program 
LEBM Lanka Eksath Bhikkhu Mandalaya 
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
MEP Mahajana Eksath Peramuna, or Peoples United Front 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NRVA National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment  
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization 
PLOTE People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam 
PRTs Provisional Reconstruction Teams  
SLFP Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
SLMSS Sri Lanka Maha Sangha Sabha 
SNP Sinhalese Nationalist Party 
 xiv 
STAY Skills Training for Afghan Youth 
TELO Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization  
TULF Tamil United Liberation Front 
UN United Nations 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees 
UNP United National Party (or Eksath Jathika Pakshaya) 
U.S. United States 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
WFP United Nations World Food Program  





First, I would like to give thanks to God for all the blessings he has bestowed 
upon me and my family.  I also extend my sincerest gratitude to Dr. Kapur and Dr. 
Chatterjee for answering ―the 40,000 foot question‖ and challenging the status quo with 
regards to extremism and terrorism; and how not only to combat it, but to understand its 
true causes that expand all religious, political, and socioeconomic areas of the world.  
Lastly, I would like to acknowledge the most important people in my life: my wife, 
Hillell, and my children, Christyanna, and Mossimo.  They are the reason for my 
existence and inspiration behind this thesis.  
 
 xvi 




We will challenge the poverty and hopelessness and lack of education and 
failed governments that too often allow conditions that terrorists can 
seize.1                      –George W. Bush  
Countries such as the United States that are embroiled in a war against Islamic 
radicalism are reasserting the educational aspects of modernization theory.  For instance, 
many world leaders now support the investment of millions of private and government 
funds into bringing secular education into remote regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan in 
the hope of combating terrorism. For instance, President Obama’s National Security 
Strategy of 2010 addressed the need to promote America’s goal of promoting global 
cooperation and development.  This included strengthening relationships with countries 
like Afghanistan and Pakistan by improving their socio-economic development, which 
includes their education systems. President Obama also supports the rights of women and 
girls for empowerment and education to further their position in their respective 
societies.2   
The 9/11 Commission Report of July 2004 emphasized the importance of 
educational opportunity in the Middle East and South Asia in uprooting terrorist 
ideology, and also of increasing congressional oversight of U.S. Aid programs to ensure 
Pakistan increased its education spending. According to Lisa Curtis’s article, ―U.S. Aid to 
Pakistan: Countering Extremism: Through Education Reform,‖ U.S. assistance to 
primary education and literacy in Pakistan more than doubled from $28 million in fiscal 
year 2004 to $66 million in fiscal year 2005.  In addition, the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) constructed and furnished sixty-five primary, 
middle, and high schools in five agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA).3  
                                                 
1 Scott Atran, ―Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,‖ Science 299, no. 5612 (2003): 1534–1536. 
2 President Barack Obama, National Security Strategy of the United States (2010) DIANE Publishing, 
2010. 
3 Lisa. A. Curtis, U.S. Aid to Pakistan: Countering Extremism through Education Reform, Heritage 
Foundation, 2007. 
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Curt Tarnoff, in a Congressional Research Service (CRS), noted that the U.S. 
program in Afghanistan is intended to ―stabilize and strengthen the Afghan economic, 
social, political, and security environment to blunt popular support for extremist forces in 
the region.‖4  He noted that more than six hundred schools have been constructed or 
rehabilitated, teachers trained (more than 50,000 since January 2006), and millions of 
textbooks printed.  The women’s dorm at the University of Kabul has been rehabilitated 
to ensure that female students can go to the university without fear from Taliban 
extremists.  The American University of Afghanistan and the International School of 
Kabul were established, and literacy programs are being implemented nationwide as 
well.5  In addition, the U.S. has recognized the efforts of people like Greg Mortenson, the 
founder of Central Asia Institute (CAI), an NGO that focuses on educational 
development in the region and has established or assisted over 171 schools in the 
Pakistan and Afghanistan region.  
Interestingly, the focus on education in U.S. Foreign Policy is not new or unique.  
In 1977, then Secretary of State Warren Christopher in his ―Human Rights Policy‖ 
address mentioned the human right to the fulfillment of such vital needs as food shelter, 
health care, and education. Secretary Christopher may not have been the catalyst of 
promoting the right to education throughout the world; however, he is proof that policy 
makers had the idea of promoting education before the current Afghanistan crisis.6   
Modernization theorists, such as Francis Fukuyama, see middle-class societies as 
a product of universal education.7  According to Fukuyama, continual growth of 
industrial societies means a requirement of more skilled and educated workers to sustain 
it.8  One of his theories on modern education was that it ―stimulates a certain tendency 
                                                 
4 Curt Tarnoff, ―Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,‖ Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress (CRS Order Code R0699), 2010, 3. 
5 Ibid., 7. 
6 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy (Princeton University 
Press, 1996) 5–6. 
7 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press; Maxwell 
Macmillan International, 1992) 116. 
8 Ibid. 
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toward relativism, that is, the doctrine that all horizons and values systems are relative to 
their time and place, and that none are true but reflect the prejudices or interests of those 
who advance them.‖9  In other words, education makes people more tolerant. 
Similarly, Douglas Kellner, a Professor of Education at UCLA, also states that 
education provides the skills necessary to improve one’s life in order to make a better 
society as well as a more civilized and developed world.10  Social literacy programs 
should be taught in all educational systems with the goals of relating to others, 
negotiating differences, conflict resolution, and positive communication and social 
interaction in diverse situations.11  His vision for educators were to understand the 
evolution of technology, conflicts between ethnicities, classes, genders, and religions in 
order to create an atmosphere of diversity, tolerance, and a strengthened democracy and 
society.  He states that the final result desired is empowerment, and with empowerment 
comes a more modern and productive society.12 
The current focus on education for resolving conflict is also highlighted in the 
work of individuals such as Greg Mortenson, author of Three Cups of Tea, Stones into 
Schools, and founder of the CAI who claims that secular education reduces the likelihood 
that individuals will be involved in terrorism.  His efforts gained worldwide attention in 
the past decade, leading Admiral Mullen (Joint Chiefs of Staff), U.S. Presidents Clinton 
and George W. Bush, and General Musharraf of Pakistan, to endorse Mortenson’s 
approach as one of the answers to combat terrorism.   
Such works would also make some believe that terrorist indoctrination and 
training is conducted in isolated areas such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, where there are 
no established educational institutions.  Greg Mortenson’s book, Three Cups of Tea, is a 
 
 
                                                 
9 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 306. 
10 Michael A. Peters, Education, Globalization, and the State in the Age of Terrorism (Paradigm 
Publishers, 2004 50. 
11 Ibid., 52. 
12 Ibid., 54. 
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depiction of his attempt to reach the K2 summit in 1993.  Separated from his group and 
injured, he was found and nursed back to health from lack of food and exposure by the 
villagers in Korphe.    
After recovering from his injuries, he promised that he would return one day to 
build a school after he noticed the lack of education and the plight of females in that 
village.13  In 1996, he built his first school in Korphe.  He later proceeded to build 
twenty-eight additional school buildings, fifteen water projects and four women’s 
vocational centers that are now in parts of northern Pakistan and neighboring 
Afghanistan.14  His book Stones into Schools is a continuation of his efforts in other 
remote areas in Pakistan and Afghanistan. To summarize his position, he writes, ―I am 
dismayed by the West’s failure or unwillingness to recognize that establishing secular 
schools that offer children balanced and nonextremist form of education is the cheapest 
and most effective way of combating this kind of indoctrination.‖15   
Although Mortenson’s efforts are courageous in locations where he built schools 
to advance the future of many children, terrorist operations are conducted all over the 
world, and secular education does not appear to be lacking in some of the areas in 
question.  This thesis argues that the focus on education by many world leaders, as noble 
as it may be, is an insufficient solution to the problem of terrorist indoctrination.  Such a 
focus on secular education without a larger political and economic reform brings a false 
sense of security to reformers because education without other inputs is not sufficient in 
combating terrorism.  Larger socio-economic reforms, which take into consideration local 
political and economic settings, are required.  
Several cases across the world illustrate the importance of recognizing that 
education without economic and political representation is not sufficient to solve the 
problems of terrorism.  In fact, a further sense of deprivation may occur among the 
                                                 
13 Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin, Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission to Fight Terrorism 
and Build Nations-- One School at a Time (New York: Viking, 2006). 
14 Ibid. 
15 Greg Mortenson, Stones into Schools: Promoting Peace with Books, Not Bombs, in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan (New York: Viking, 2009).  
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educated who do not necessarily gain political representation and economic gains.  This 
thesis illustrates this point by providing a comparative case of Sri Lanka, where the 
educated Sri Lankan Tamil community became embroiled in civil war with the Buddhist 
Sinhalese community over their rights to public goods, one of the most important being 
educational institutions.  The case illustrates that lack of education was not the point of 
contention, but who had access to it and who did not given a specific type of job 
opportunities.  The competition between the Sinhala and Tamil communities eventually 
lead to civil war, which lasted almost three decades. 
A. BACKGROUND 
A comparative analysis illustrates that education by itself does not prevent 
terrorism.  Although lack of educational opportunities might play a factor into one’s 
desire to resort to terrorist acts, illiteracy is not what leads to the final decision to engage 
in terrorist acts.  Various studies in terrorism, the most famous being Marc Sageman’s, 
illustrate that terrorism is not an act mainly perpetrated by the poor and the uneducated; it 
is the well-planned and coordinated targeting of a specific group, political or economic.16  
Mohamed Atta, known as one of the major players of 9/11, came from a well-educated 
and wealthy family in Egypt.17  In Palestine, Hanadi Tayseer Jaradat, who was days away 
from earning her law degree from Yarmouk University, detonated a bomb in a restaurant 
in Haifa, Israel, killing herself and nineteen Israelis and injuring fifty others on October 
4, 2003.18  Both events occurred in different parts of the world; however, both individuals 
were educated and decided to participate in terrorist acts. 
This thesis will demonstrate that secular education does not combat terrorism by 
looking at the case of Sri Lanka, where education became a major factor that brought the 
country into one of the bloodiest and longest civil wars in South Asia.  Sri Lanka is one 
                                                 
16 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004). 
17 Paul Zarembka, The Hidden History of 9-11-2001, 1st ed. (Amsterdam; Oxford: Elsevier JAI, 
2006). 
18 La Voz de Aztlan, ―Palestinian Women Martyrs Against the Israeli Occupation,‖ 
http://www.aztlan.net/women_martyrs.htm (accessed August 1, 2010). 
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of the leaders in South Asia with regards to education; however, it is home to one of the 
most notable terrorist groups in the world, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  
There are several terrorist and extremist groups in Sri Lanka, but none have made their 
mark on the country, as well as the world, like the LTTE.  The LTTE not only devastated 
a small country like Sri Lanka, but at one point, they led the world in suicide bombings.  
Sri Lanka’s established education systems for both the Sinhala and Tamil population 
could not prevent civil war; in fact the nature of the college education and lack of 
opportunities associated with the educated became the focal point in grievances, which 
then manifested as an ethnic conflict.19 
B. HISTORICAL EXAMPLE:  SRI LANKA 
Until 1969, university entrance in Sri Lanka was based on merit and Tamil 
students dominated the universities, especially in the science-based disciplines.  
However, 1974 was the beginning of the ―standardization‖ of university admittance 
which switched the language of the test to Sinhala, which resulted in Tamil enrollment 
plummeting.  The change in policy was due to pressures from the Sinhala ethnic parties 
that demanded the shift in the post-colonial phase in which the rural communities had not 
advanced at all economically.  Tamils who were academically qualified to go to 
universities due to the presence of Catholic schools in Tamil areas were marginalized 
when the state passed The Sinhala Only policy.  This solidified the sense of insecurity 
among Tamils about the Sinhalese authorities, which then led to further ethnic 
polarization.20   
The Tamil elite claimed that the Sinhalese government had deprived them of 
territory, language, citizenship, economic life, opportunities of employment, and 
education.  By 1974, Tamil dissatisfaction had fostered a radical movement that would 
later be known as the LTTE. The goal of the LTTE was to establish ―The free, sovereign, 
                                                 
19 S. T. Hettige, ―5 Economic Policy, Changing Opportunities for Youth, and the Ethnic Conflict in Sri 
Lanka,‖ Economy, Culture, and Civil War in Sri Lanka (2004): 115. 
20 Michael Edward Brown and Sumit Ganguly, Fighting Words: Language Policy and Ethnic 
Relations in Asia, ed. (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. 
Kennedy School of Government: The MIT Press, 2003), 131. 
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secular, socialist state of Tamil Eelam based on the right of self-determination inherent in 
every nation.‖21  This movement by the Tamils was to give notice to the Sinhalese elite of 
their rights to equality in Sri Lanka and that they were as entitled to it as any other group 
in the country.  However, this movement only delayed the inevitable.   
In 1978, an attempt by the Sinhalese to accommodate the Tamils came too late 
and was not sufficient enough to end the ongoing tension between the two ethnic groups.  
Although it claimed to provide more Tamil students with more educational opportunities, 
it provided minimal support towards school supplies and facilities.  Books were 
inaccurate or written in the wrong language, and university requirements remained tied to 
Sinhalese, which ultimately eliminated the Tamils who were taught in English or Tamil 
schools.22   
A final breaking point occurred when the Jaffna Municipal Library was burned to 
the ground with 100,000 ancient and rare Tamil documents in 1981.  This action 
solidified the belief to Tamils that the cultural, as well as educational opportunities, had 
become targets of the Sinhalese extremists.  None of the Sinhalese perpetrators were held 
accountable.  The lack of education was not the primary concern since education was 
deeply promoted by the post-colonial state as part of the larger modernization project.  
The fact remains that one community (Tamils) felt unqualified to gain jobs and elite 
representation over another (Sinhalese) in Sri Lanka was the central point of contention. 
By the 1980s, the LTTE was to become one of the most violent separatist groups 
in the twentieth century.23  The LTTE is the only terrorist group which possessed its own 
infantry, sea wing, and air wing in its campaign in Sri Lanka for a separate Tamil 
homeland in 1983.  On January 10, 2008, the FBI reported that ―The LTTE is one of the 
                                                 
21 Brown and Ganguly, Fighting Words, 132–133. 
22 Ibid., 133–134. 
23 Neil DeVotta, Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri 
Lanka, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 168–170. 
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most dangerous and deadly extremist outfits in the world and the world should be 
concerned about other organizations they inspired including the al-Qaeda in Iraq.‖24 
The LTTE was also first to introduce suicide bombings to their operations.  It also 
introduced women as well as children into their operations.  The LTTE women called 
―Birds of Freedom‖ carried out 30% of their suicide bombing attacks during 1987–
2000.25  Children were recruited heavily in orphanages by having shrines of martyrs set 
up where they could see them daily to entice them into joining LTTE suicide 
operations.26  For recruitment, the LTTE infiltrated the education system by gaining 
access to schools in order to recruit students.  LTTE members took over classes to 
indoctrinate children into their ideology, which led to new membership.27   
The case of Sri Lanka demonstrates that while ethnic-based indoctrination began 
in Sri Lanka in the 1980s, the origin of the conflict lay among groups that were educated 
in secular schools.  Since the post-colonial phase, Sri Lanka continued its inherited 
British educational system.  In fact, the secular education system was at the center of 
grievances listed by the Sinhala extremists that argued that it gave minorities like the 
Tamils an advantage over the Sinhalese.  This case challenges theories that focus on 
education as a solution.  Sri Lanka proves that well-established secular educational 
institutions can become problematic and a symbol of political conflict.  The comparative 
analysis may be applied to the Afghanistan situation. 
Terrorism is not isolated in remote areas in Islamic countries that the United 
States deems as a threat to national security.  It is all over the world in areas such as 
Palestine, Indonesia, Lebanon, Israel, Spain, Turkey, and India; it is supported by 
numerous groups with many agendas. We see shades of it in the U.S. as well (for 
example, the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing).  In the current global context, terrorist 
                                                 
24 South Asia Terrorism Portal, ―Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),‖ 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/LTTE.HTM (accessed September 1, 
2010). 
25 Anat Berko, The Path to Paradise :The Inner World of Suicide Bombers and their Dispatchers 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 113. 
26 James J. F. Forest, The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes (Westport, 
CT: Praeger Security International, 2006). 
27 Forest, The Making of a Terrorist, 156. 
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organizations recruit from all socioeconomic, religious and cultural backgrounds.  
Mortenson’s efforts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan are to be commended, but building 
more secular schools without taking other factors into context is not a solution to 
terrorism. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Given the growth of the madrasas in Pakistan and Afghanistan, several scholars 
and policy makers suggest that educational issues are a priority.  There is a belief that a 
Western approach of establishing secular education in places of conflict and 
underdevelopment would answer the problems of extremist indoctrination.  This concept 
has been addressed by many scholars long before 9/11.  The following literature review 
will illustrate how some scholars support the idea of education to combat terrorist 
indoctrination as well as illustrate early examples from other scholars, showing the 
correlation between education and a civil society.  It will also show scholars who have 
done extensive research to prove that this policy lacks the holistic approach which may 
be problematic. 
Greg Mortenson’s Three Cups of Tea is an example of the most prominent 
approach to combating terrorism by education in this decade.  His book is a depiction of a 
personal journey to reach the top of the K2 Mountains in Pakistan, which the author 
initiated as a tribute to his late sister, who died of epilepsy.  Lost and separated from his 
group, he is found and led to the village of Korphe in Pakistan.  The villagers nurse him 
back to health and treat him as one of their own.  Inspired by the Spartan existence and 
lack of a school, Mortenson dedicates his life to helping Korphe by beginning a quest to 
build a school with personal and private funding.  In making several visits to Korphe to 
build its first school and interacting with children and the village leaders, he concludes 
that secular education can reduce extremist behavior.28 
Mortenson’s book, Stones into Schools, which came out in 2009 depicts 
Mortenson’s continuing efforts in Afghanistan.  Mortenson establishes schools in the 
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Badakshan Province and the Wakhan Corridor.  It also depicts how he built relationships 
with Islamic clerics, militia commanders, and tribal leaders, as well as how he 
experienced an eight-day armed abduction by the Taliban.  At this point, Mortenson 
began to receive support from world leaders.29   
Yet, some important gaps are noticeable in Mortenson’s writings.  First, why does 
he believe that targeting females will alleviate the threat of terrorism?  Since his efforts 
are not directed at male children, should we then assume that they will continue to be 
taught in madrasas?  How then does this solve the problem?  Would this not further 
contribute to gender divisions between in the region, or do the local males support this 
system?  Second, many females funded by Mortenson, have furthered their education 
funded by going to universities; have they gone back to their villages to give back to 
prevent extremism taught in madrasas?  There is no evidence of this.   
Second, he suggests that the clerics in the area support his efforts.  Do all the 
madrasas in areas that have new schools support Mortenson?  Why has he not been able 
to expand to other places?  Does it suggest that the areas where he is established were 
already open to different ideas and did not have extremist organizations?  In addition, the 
madrasa way of education is part of the Muslim world for centuries so one should not 
defer to the notion that madrasa education means extremist indoctrination.   
Mortenson also focuses on rural areas.   Are rural tribal areas the only problem?  
This is also important since many terrorist acts, such as 9/11, were perpetrated by well-
educated individuals that were not from tribal areas. For instance, Mohamed Atta, the 
organizer of the 9/11 attacks, was from Cairo, Egypt.  His father was a lawyer and 
Mohamed was a graduate of Cairo University in 1986 with a degree in architecture.  It 
was after graduation that he became involved in Muslim extremist politics.  Al-Qaeda 
agents saw his educational background and commitment to radical Islam as the key to his 
recruitment, which would focus his mission to lead the 9/11 attacks on the U.S.30  
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Both of Mortenson’s books would lead one subscribe to the notion that terrorists 
are poor, displaced, and their indoctrination is given in remote locations in Muslim 
countries.  This assumption is inaccurate because extremist behavior and indoctrination 
can occur anywhere in the world.  His suggestions for the region do not examine the 
historical development programs in the region.  Modernization projects were already 
operating in the region long before the U.S. began Operation Enduring Freedom. 
Many NGOs already operate in the Afghanistan; some successful, and some not 
so successfully.  Nosheen Ali suggests that Mortenson’s community-based, participatory 
education model envisioned in Three Cups of Tea was already in practice in the region by 
institutions like the Aga Khan Rural Support Program.31  In addition, it is not often 
recognized that the United States already provides assistance through Provisional 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that build schools, dig wells, and provide medical help.32  
It is the implementation that is the problem, which requires a more political approach.   
Such books are now required readings for the United States military.  The 
message of ―books not bombs‖ resonates stronger now since the war on terrorism is 
going on its tenth year and it has many questioning the war efforts of the United States in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  Mortenson’s supporters such as Sharmeen Obiad-Chinoy state, 
―By deliberately depriving young Muslims from receiving a good education, the 
fundamentalists ensure that the future of their potential recruits is bleak and the resulting 
frustrations make them easily susceptible to terrorist ideology.‖33  Radical education was 
not a cause that led to political strategy by radical groups, but a result.  Mortenson’s work 
implies the reverse.  
Some other, arguably more important scholars, point to similar roles of education 
in combating terrorism.  According to these scholars, education promotes tolerance and 
development.  Scholars like Fukuyama believed that inequality is a result of unequal 
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access to education and that a lack of education is the surest condemnation to second-
class citizenship.  Fukuyama also believed that education makes a person more self-
reliant, which leads to respect for their fellow citizens and from the state.34  
Samuel P. Huntington also supports the notion that education meant a more 
industrious and socially mobile society.  Huntington believed that education leads to 
social mobility, which then produces a more powerful society.35  With regards to 
modernization and human development, Huntington stated that both were produced, ―by 
greater education, awareness, and understanding of human society and its natural 
environment produced sustained movement toward higher and higher levels of 
civilization.‖36 
Mark Olsen views education as crucial for democracy.  He sees schools as a 
connection to communities with the ability to empower families and involve minority 
groups in community projects.  It encompasses the democratic norms of trust and 
political decision making.  Olson did not view education as brainwashing or socialization 
with regards to development of a democratic society, but a ―teaching of skills and 
establishing models of civic conduct based on tolerance, deliberation, conflict resolution, 
give-and-take, and trust.‖37  Such views are fairly common among modernization 
scholars and promote the notion of funding education to bring stability in societies. 
The World Development Report 2007 found that young people have the right to 
the knowledge and skills to become productive workers, parents, and responsible 
citizens.38  This begins early in schools, which will mean a better citizen for society later 
on, especially with the rise of globalization and modernization throughout the world.  
However, education is not enough when there is no benefit for youths who participate in 
them.  It is the responsibility of the government to develop a system of education that 
                                                 
34 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 116. 
35 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 1st 
Touchstone ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 85–86. 
36 Ibid., 320. 
37 Peters, Education, Globalization, and the State in the Age of Terrorism, 170–171. 
38 World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation (Washington, D.C; 
Oxford: World Bank; Oxford University Press, 2006), 68. 
 13 
gives the life skills and abilities to become productive members of their respective 
societies in this developing world. In other words, education systems have to be 
developed in the context of the regional economies.39  
Todd Schmidt supports that notion by stating:  
The U.S. needs to undertake a major effort to reorient the madrasa system 
so that education in the Muslim world focuses less on reproducing 
repressive religious ideologies and more on teaching skills needed to 
develop and globalize their economies; think critically and act 
independently and exercise freedom of initiative.‖40  He also targets 
educating parents by proposing more literacy programs for Muslim 
parents.41  He concludes that, ―Imams continue to man the front line, 
protecting and defending their faith; To the extent that we can help them 
realize that the most enlightened way to do so is through liberal, secular 
education, the better off we will be.42  
The Saudi Program,43 Turkish schools in Pakistan, and The Enlightenment 
Program in Iraq show that there has been some progress in combating terrorism.  Sabrina 
Tavernise depicted how Turkish Schools in Pakistan made progress in changing the 
educational outlook for children in poor neighborhoods vis-à-vis radical Islamic 
teachings in madrasas by prescribing to a strong western curriculum.44  Their belief is 
that it is an alternate approach that could help reduce the influence of Islamic 
extremists.45  
In Afghanistan and Pakistan, poverty and lack of quality education is a focal point 
for many in the international community.  In Afghanistan, where over 90% of the world’s 
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heroin is grown and $3 billion is pumped into the Afghan economy by its sales, the 
Taliban have destroyed schools, killed teachers and students, as well as targeted females 
to suppress the goal of empowerment for Muslim women.46  In the past four decades, 
Pakistan received more aid than any country except India, Egypt, and Israel.47  However, 
the country’s infant mortality and female and secondary enrollment are the worst in the 
world; half of the Pakistani children are functionally illiterate.48  Many blame the current 
situation on the government.  However, the rise of the madrasa education is not the cause 
but a result of these social problems that the country currently faces.   
Free room and board in modern cities and towns lures poor parents towards 
madrasa education.  But, they do not realize that some of them teach extremist ideology, 
which targets Islamic youths to carry out their Jihadist operations.49  However, do 
increasing secular schools solve the problem when there is no political will to change the 
overall environment where there is a shortage of jobs, as well as political views that 
sponsor extremism?  Academic exiles from Afghanistan seeking a better life in Pakistan 
often end up in worse conditions and often seek asylum from western countries.50   
The inability of the state to accommodate its educated is not unique to the region, 
and therefore not an Islamic issue.  A comparative case study of Sri Lanka will highlight 
how secular education did not solve the resource problem confronted by the new state in 
the post-colonial period, but created a hyper-competitive environment that highlighted 
the country’s ethnic divisions leading to prolonged civil war.  Several political and 
economic factors contributed to the conflict in Sri Lanka, as is the case in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, where the problems are by no means limited to domestic lack of education 
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in rural areas.  Sri Lanka has one of the higher rates of literacy in the South Asia Region; 
education policy has been a focal point of the conflict.  Sri Lanka’s civil war highlights 
points made by several scholars regarding the role the elite play in competing for 
resources.  The role of the elite in the conflict is pointed out by several authors using 
comparative analysis. 
Russell and Miller profiled 350 terrorists from eighteen Middle Eastern, Latin 
American, Western European, and Japanese countries in order to study whether 
universities provided a recruiting base for future terrorists.51  They discovered that two-
thirds of those individuals came from upper middle class backgrounds, had parents who 
were professionals (doctors, lawyers, engineers), and had a university background.52  
Marc Sageman’s famous study examines the educational background of 137 terrorist’s.53  
With regards to the belief that a majority who went to religious schools, only 17% of his 
cases went to Islamic schools and the rest were educated in secular schools.54  He 
identified that over 60% of those terrorists had at least some college education, which 
made them more educated than the average person worldwide and especially more 
educated than the majority of those in the third world.55  His data on the Salafi Mujahidin 
refuted the widespread belief that terrorism is a result of poverty and lack of education.56 
Pape conducted a similar survey of 232 total Arab suicide attackers associated 
with Lebanon, Palestine, and al-Qaeda from 1980 to 2003.57  His findings were that Arab 
suicide attackers were much better educated than the conventional profile would 
suggest.58  He also noted that 54% had some post-secondary education, compared with 
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only a small fraction of their societies.59  Seventy-six percent had working-class or 
middle-class jobs, which refuted the assumption that the majority of suicide bombers 
were uneducated or poor.60  He concluded that suicide bombers are not mainly poor, 
uneducated, and religious zealots, but well-educated individuals who are politically 
conscious who might join a movement more likely than wayward adolescents or religious 
fanatics.61  
Dr. Thomas Strentz of the FBI’s Behavioral Science Unit profiled right-wing 
terrorist leaders and followers, which are almost identical to Sageman’s sample.  He 
identified a right-wing terrorist leader as college educated, thirty-five to fifty years old, 
urban and sophisticated, literate, highly verbal, well-trained and perfectionist, and 
politically active.62  For the follower, the characteristics included: limited formal 
education, 20- to 50-plus years old, unsophisticated, not verbal, untrained with poor work 
skills, and politically naïve.63  
With regards to poverty, Salil Tripathi stated, ―There are many good reasons to 
eliminate poverty; but we should not expect terrorism to decline as a result.‖64  Tripathi’s 
analysis of Hezbollah recruits showed that a majority lived above the poverty line and 
had a higher education.65  Claude Berribi’s study among the Palestinians found no link 
between poverty and education associated with terrorism.66  Harowitz’s article, ―You 
Might Be a Terrorist If…,‖ agreed with the NYPD’s 9/11 report that concluded that 
―There is no useful profile that one can use to spot a terrorist, because they come from  
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varied backgrounds.‖67  Scott Atran’s article, ―Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,‖ states that, 
―Suicide terrorists generally are not lacking in legitimate life opportunities relative to 
their general population.‖68  
After conducting their own extensive research on terrorism, Kruger and 
Maleckova concluded that terrorism is a political and not an economic phenomenon.69  
One of their findings were that a lack of civil liberties is associated with higher 
participation in terrorism and that low income has no direct connection.70  They state: 
―our review of the evidence provides little reason for optimism that a reduction in poverty 
or an increase in educational attainment would meaningfully reduce international 
terrorism.‖71  Another conclusion was that, ―well educated, middle or upper class 
individuals are better suited to carry out acts of international terrorism than are 
impoverished illiterates because the terrorists must fit into a foreign environment to be 
successful.‖72 
Austin Turk, author of ―Sociology of Terrorism,‖ stated that terrorist acts are 
political and rarely involve psychopathology or material deprivation.73  He finds that 
terrorism is associated with relative affluence and social advantage rather than poverty, 
lack of education or other deprivation.74  The typical terrorist in his view comes from 
well-civilized and elite parts of the world, motivated by political-ideological resentments 
rather than economic distress.75  He also finds that the more educated and affluent their 
backgrounds, the more impatient they are with disappointments of political life.76  With 
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regards to education he cautions that, ―education, training, socialization (deliberate or 
not), may encourage the development of a self-concept as one who must fight against the 
threat to us.‖77     
Robert J. Barro, professor of economics at Harvard University and senior fellow 
of the Hoover Institution, theorized that the poorest, least-educated persons make 
relatively ineffective terrorists.  It is also likely that some forms of education, such as 
those practiced in the West Bank, Gaza, and other parts of the Middle East, tend to 
promote terrorism.  He also stated that ―it is naive to think that increases in income and 
education will, by themselves, lower international terrorism.‖78   
Education appears to increase dissatisfaction and awareness about one condition.  
According to Sumit Ganguly, his The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of 
Peace, Kashmiris with more access to education became more aware of the lack of free 
exercise of adult franchise in Kashmir compared to all other parts of India leading to their 
political mobilization.  He concluded that as the literacy rates went up, individuals had a 
better comprehension of the social and political forces that affected their lives, which 
meant an increased awareness of politics at local, national, and international levels.  This, 
as well as other factors, led to the insurgency in Kashmir.  In short, Ganguly proved that 
as the Kashmiri’s gained more access to education, it made them smarter and bolder 
against their oppressors.79 
Interestingly, although a step away from terrorism, Paulo Freire who has argued 
for a major shift in political systems, encouraged revolution through education, 
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His main arguments lies in how education provided the foundation of mobilization that 
empowered individuals in their struggle against oppressive governments.80  One of his 
conclusions was:  
Education for freedom implies constantly, permanently, the exercise of 
consciousness turning in on itself in order to discover itself in the 
relationships with the world, trying to explain the reasons which can make 
clear the concrete situation people have in the world.81 
The above counterarguments prove that education without shifts in the political 
and economic context will not prevent terrorism.  There are several other factors 
(marginalization, racism, religious oppression, etc.) that can contribute to ones choosing 
to participate in terrorist activities.82  In the end, it is that individual’s decision, not 
educational background that will determine if they will either live in peace or turn to 
terrorist activities. 
D. METHOD 
This thesis will use a historical study of the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam 
(LTTE) in Sri Lanka and eleven terrorist profiles of educated individuals as a 
counterexample to the theory education reduces conflict and terrorism.  For Sri Lanka, it 
was not the lack of education that caused its bloody civil war, but a sense of 
marginalization among the Tamils due to, a language movement by S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike, and Buddhist extremists who sought to  reduce educational opportunities 
for the Tamil Minority that were better educated than the Sinhala under the British.  The 
LTTE, founded by educated Tamils, became the most noted and feared terrorist 
organization in South Asia.   
The eleven terrorist events spanned different times and locations.  All the 
individuals involved had different agendas, goals and beliefs associated with their causes.  
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But one characteristic remained constant for all these events: the perpetrators as well as 
the masterminds involved came from educated backgrounds.  This will erase the Western 
idea of how terrorists are poor, uneducated, and displaced persons from some Third 
World country. 
The last chapter will show that although the U.S. has invested billions of dollars 
in Afghanistan, the people of the country still lacks access to basic needs, such as clean 
water, health care, food, and most of all the ability to have a steady income due to lack of 
jobs.  The U.S. can boast that literacy rates are improving and education opportunities are 
expanding to females for empowerment in their society.  However, unless there is a way 
to have the basic necessities provided to the majority of a population that is ranked one of 
the poorest in the world, education improvements will neither sustain nor improve the 
economic and social condition of Afghanistan.  The last chapter will be followed by the 
conclusion.  The final result desired in this thesis is to provide historical (and current) 
proof that modernization through education alone is not the answer to terrorist 
prevention.  
 21 
II. SRI LANKA’S INDEPENDENCE, NATIONAL MOVEMENTS, 
THE LTTE, AND EDUCATION SYSTEM 
This chapter provides a historical background on the post-colonial development of 
Sinhalese nationalism, which involved a language movement and a demand of preference 
in educational institutions.  This movement produced Buddhist-led violence toward 
Tamils in Sri Lanka that led to Tamil marginalization, and finally a bloody civil war.  The 
Tamils were a well-educated community, leading some of the Sinhalese to believe that 
the Tamil minority was favored by the British colonial phase.  They sought to ―return‖  
the Buddhist Sinhalese to the prominent position which they felt it ought to reflect since 
they were the majority.  This belief led to racism, and violence towards the Tamil 
minority that brought this country to a three decade long civil war and currently, presents 
a unresolved situation with thousands dead on both sides.  Ironically, education policy 
became the point of contention along with language in this conflict.  It was not the lack of 
education, but the distribution of education and employment related to it in the face of 
low development in other sectors.  The rural Buddhist majority felt deprived when it 
came to the largest growing sector, the state bureaucracy and non-rural industrial sector.   
A. THE END OF THE LTTE? 
The year 2009 marked the end of the Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE.  Its 
leader and founder, Velupillai Prabhakaran, was killed along with most of the 
organization’s command structure.  In twenty-six years, the LTTE sustained the longest 
running suicide campaigns to date with thousands of casualties (both civilian and 
military). With a force of about 20,000 (at its highest) members, it waged havoc on Sri 







LTTE’s forces, Air Tigers, and Sea Tigers, were the basis of their conventional forces, its 
strategic use of suicide bombings by their Black Tigers were the most effective in 
prolonging the civil war in Sri Lanka.83   
Although the LTTE was defeated, the Sinhalese government must still have to 
deal with thousands of displaced Tamils from the war, as well as answer to the United 
Nations (U.N.) and international community for human rights violations as well as 
accusations of ethnic cleansing.  Currently, the Sinhalese government refuses to allow 
any U.N. or international organizations to investigate wrongdoing by the Sinhalese 
government or its security forces towards the Tamil population by what Rohan Gunaratna 
calls their campaign against the Tamil Tigers as a ―humanitarian mission.‖84  In order to 
understand the ethnic conflict and continued displacement and marginalization of the 
ethnic Tamils by the Sinhalese, an explanation of the roots of the Sinhalese resentment 
towards the Tamils is required.  Once Great Britain gave independence to Sri Lanka in 
1948, national and religious movements driven by Buddhist extremists led to racism, 
marginalization, and ethnic violence against the Tamils.  These actions also led to the rise 
of the LTTE and the bloodiest civil war in South Asia. 
B. THE SINHALESE VIEW OF POST-COLONIZATION 
From the Sinhalese perspective, history is about a struggle to protect their ancient 
heritage.  They viewed themselves as a Buddhist minority vastly outnumbered by Hindus 
of India, especially by the Dravidian masses of South India who are the closest proximity.  
The migration of Tamils into their lands for over a thousand years, including the several 
thousand Tamils who were brought in to Sri Lanka by the British to work in the tea 
estates provided the foundation of Sinhalese insecurities towards their bordering 
neighbors.  During colonization, the Sinhalese endured second class citizenship to the 
British while other minorities, primarily the Tamils, gained economic and social 
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mobility.85  While some western educated Sinhala did do well in Sri Lanka, many of 
them converted to Christianity adding to the sense of threat of being undermined. 
For the Tamils, British rule meant benefits that included more education, which 
led to more civil-service jobs, university enrollment, and trade with the British.  The 
Sinhalese witnessed the gains made by the Tamil minority with the belief that the Tamil’s 
were threatening the Sinhalese way of life.  Sinhalese fears came to an end when the 
British gave independence to Sri Lanka.  Once independent of British rule, the Sinhalese 
began the process of creating a state that reflected and favored the majority.  For the 
Tamils this meant marginalization by the Sinhalese government, that was led by a 
Buddhist movement.86   
Once independence was achieved in 1948, Buddhist extremists hoped to fulfill 
their mission of Sinhalese dominance.  Once in power, secular minded Sinhalese felt 
compelled to show some consideration to the Tamil minority.  However, Buddhist 
extremists did not approve those concessions, which led to hostility between the 
Sinhalese and Tamils.  The memories of being second-class citizens during British rule 
played themselves out among the predominately Sinhalese population, leading to 
marginalizing of the Tamil population as symbols of obstacles to the formation of the 
Sinhalese nation-state.87 
C. BUDDHIST EXTREMISM, SINHALESE LANGUAGE MOVEMENT, 
AND TAMIL MARGINALIZATION 
For the extremists, they believe that they are defending the last space for 
Buddhism in South Asia which was its birthplace.  They view the Aryan Sinhalese 
people, defined by its language as the ―lion race‖ imperiled by the Dravidian menace of 
Tamils).  In addition, they also fear the loss of Buddhism by the overwhelming Hindu 
majority in India which is not too far away.  They continue to express their concerns 
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about the dangers they face as a minority within the South Asian region at the price of 
intolerance to the Tamil minority.  Such insecurities evolved into a belief that only 
Buddhism can hold Sri Lanka together and preserve it as a nation.88  
The Buddhist extremist platform continues to influence Sri Lankan politics today, 
regardless of the defeat of the LTTE.  First, they continue to justify their actions and 
beliefs based on the Sinhalese history of struggle, and the goal of a Sinhalese-only state 
of Sri Lanka.  Second, Sinhalese monks, and the bikkus, use their positions as ritual 
leaders, in which followers cannot express dissent which validates influence of Buddhist 
monks in Sri Lankan politics.  Third, politicians are continuously manipulated by 
extremist’s sentiments in order to advance their own short term interests.  Fourth, the 
two-party systems (SLFP and SNP) in 1956 only sustained Sinhalese Buddhist extremism 
due to their involvement in elections in which they would side with the one party who 
would benefit their beliefs.89  
D. BUDDHIST REVIVAL 
The movement or ―revival‖ of Buddhism began in the 1950s.  This is important to 
remember because this was a precursor to the language movement, which in turn led to 
the marginalization and violence against the Tamils and future civil war with the LTTE.  
During this time, Buddhists made their presence known by ensuring that the Sinhalese 
majority supported their ideology.  The following is the evolution of that movement, 
which led to a civil war with the Tamil minority. 
1. Buddhist Theosophical Society in 1880 (Led by William Steel Olcott) 
This society led by Olcott established a code of conduct for the emergent middle 
class and business interests that would soon make a significant contribution to Buddhist 
society after independence.  One major focus was to revive past glories of Sinhalese 
civilization in order to find a nationalist identity and self-respect in the face of 
humiliations and disabilities suffered under the British rule and Christian missionary 
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influence.90  Although Olcott was one of the catalysts in reviving Buddhism, the man 
responsible for influencing radical change in Sri Lanka was Angagarika Dharmapala, 
who became the founder of the political Buddhist movement. 
Dharmapala is called the father of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism.  Although 
educated in Christian schools, he converted to Buddhism in his mid-twenties.  He 
developed a hostile attitude towards anything non-Sinhalese and blamed the British for 
introducing alcohol and opium to the Sinhalese while claiming that no nation in the world 
had a brilliant history as that mirrored among Sinhalese Buddhists and sought to revive it 
in Sri Lanka.  These attitudes were then directed towards the minorities of Sri Lanka who 
were educated and possessed advantages that the British did not afford to the Sinhalese.  
His influence would later spurn Buddhist monks and the bikkhus to step outside the 
monasteries to spurn the Sinhalese majority to follow Dharmapala’s ideology.91 
2. General Election of 1947 (Emergence of the “Political Monk” in Sri 
Lanka) 
This election led to the growth of Marxist-oriented Buddhist monks that came in 
support of leftist parties, which were dedicated to secular politics.  Labeled ―The 
Vidyalankara Group,‖ they fanned fires of future ethnic and religious violence from 
1956-1968 towards the Tamils.  Following the writings of Walpola Rahula and K. 
Pannasara, they formed the Lanka Eksath Bhikkhu Mandalaya (LEBM) (Ceylon Union of 
Bhikkhus).  However, it was the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) led by S. W. R. D. 
Bandaranaike that spurned to the language movement that ultimately led to future conflict 
with the Tamil’s and the formation of the LTTE.92  
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3. 1956 Elections and the Beginning of Tamil Oppression 
The year 1956 began a push to restore Buddhism to its pre-colonial status as well 
as the beginning of the marginalization of the Tamils.  The year 1956 was the beginning 
of Sinhalese as its national identity and mother tongue for education and national culture.  
The All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress demanded that the government should protect and 
maintain Buddhism and Buddhist institutions.  This demand led to the infamous report 
titled, The Betrayal of Buddhism, which attacked Christian education in schools (which 
many Tamils were enrolled in) as well as the secular party, and UNP’s lukewarm attitude 
toward Buddhist restoration.93 
Bandaranaike’s platform of ―Sinhala Only‖ was focused on reminding the 
Sinhalese people of British colonization and their favoritism towards the Tamil 
population that led to their underrepresentation in civil service jobs, universities, armed 
forces, and other professions.  It also reminded them of Tamil immigrants who came in 
with the British to run the tea estates.  This movement against the UNP produced another 
major political party, the SLFP which then created a competing two party system, where 
the main tactics whose tactics involved ethnic outbidding and providing the needs of their 
ethnic kin at the expense of the minorities.  This meant that the ethnic minorities had no 
real political influence and were at the mercy of the Sinhalese majority who had the 
Buddhist clergy on their side no matter which party was in power.94  Hence, began the 
process of minority marginalization in the early phases of the post-colonial phase.   
Following UNP’s loss in the 1956 elections to Bandaranaike of the SLFP, 
linguistic nationalism and educational opportunities became the main theme that 
candidates would use to bolster support from the Sinhalese majority in the following 
elections.  With Sinhalese leaders focused on Sinhalese-only policies, the Tamils were 
then forced to counter these policies with their own idea of nationalism against Sinhalese 
Buddhist nationalism.  Knowing that the Tamil population was beginning to lose faith in 
the present government and push for Tamil independence, Bandaranaike tried to 
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accommodate the Tamils when he became prime minister rather than face a civil war.  
However, Buddhist monks led protests and hunger strikes against any Tamil concessions.  
This led to a major shift in the educational and government employment policy as 
university and civil service exams were conducted in Sinhala only, quota systems to 
benefit Sinhala students for universities were created and Sinhalese-language court 
systems in Tamil areas.  This led to low Tamil representation in government service 
forming a building block for radicalization of the Tamils.  The 1956 election therefore 
began Sri Lanka’s transformation from a liberal democracy to an illiberal ethnocracy.95    
Once Sinhala became the official language of Sri Lanka, it limited the Tamil 
population’s access to colleges, public service jobs, and government positions.  Prior to 
this, the Tamils were the dominant ethnic group in colleges and universities.  Even with 
attempts by the government to provide support to Tamils, The United Front of Monks 
protested the inclusion of a clause from the government permitting individuals who had 
been educated in English or Tamil to take public examinations in that language until 
1967.  This led to the first of many demonstrations by Tamils, and also led to violent 
clashes with the Sinhalese population.96 
4. 1958 
The year 1958 marked the implementation of teacher training for Sinhalese-only 
and creating scholarships based on six-to-one ratio favoring the Sinhalese. These 
numbers reflected the population breakdown.  However, due to Tamil protests, 
Badaranaike was compelled to make some concessions to the Tamils by recognizing 
Tamil as a minority language in Northern and Eastern provinces, as well as control over 
local affairs through devolution of powers.  However, the United Front and Sri Lanka 
Maha Sangha Sabha (SLMSS) protested against surrender to Tamil demands.  Such 
concessions towards the Tamils began the bipolar oscillation in the politics of the 
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Sinhalese majority.  While Sinhalese politicians were being forced to acquiesce to 
Buddhist demands, more ethic violence would occur during this time with Tamils being 
the victim of racial prejudice and violence.97  
5. 1960s 
As the UNP SLFP grew closer ideologically, the government developed a bipolar 
division within its institutions that continued to rage against a Tamil minority which was 
either viewed as ―an enemy or ally.‖  Monks of all sects, temples, and status leaned 
toward a spectrum of parallel support for both parties.  The 1965 and1970 elections 
focused on Buddhist social welfare issues and a centralization of the school system.  This 
led to Buddhist organizations running private schools using Sinhalese as the primary 
language of instruction.98  With regards to civil service jobs, 41% of civil servants were 
Tamil in 1941.  By 1963, only 7% were Tamil, which was could only be blamed on the 
Sinhala Only Act of 1956.99 
6. 1970s 
In 1972, the Sinhalese government adopted a new constitution that made 
Buddhism the primary religion which was obviously favored and, most of all, protected 
by the state.  The Tamil Hindu minority immediately believed this to be a threat to their 
religious autonomy.  This action was viewed as a path to separatism by identifying one 
people (Sinhala) and one religion (Buddhism).  At the same time, the Sinhalese 
government encouraged Sinhalese settlement in Tamil areas to weaken local Tamil 
majorities.  These practices of discrimination to ensure that there would be no threat to 
the power structure in Sri Lanka only made it easier for the Tamils to begin their rise to 
militancy.100 
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In January 1974, nine Tamils were killed during the fourth International Tamil 
Conference.  None of the killers were held accountable by the government.  Tamil 
mobilization in 1976 led to further strikes and boycotts towards the Sinhalese dominated 
government.  The Tamil elite claimed that the Sinhalese government deprived them of 
territory, language, citizenship, economic life, opportunities of employment, and 
education.  The radical Tamil’s began the movement to establish ―The free, sovereign, 
secular, socialist state of Tamil Eelam based on the right of self-determination inherent in 
every nation.‖101 
Although the LTTE was to be the face of Tamil revolution, it was Tamil United 
Liberation Front (TULF) that began the movement for equality and access to universities 
and jobs that were being taken away from them by their Sinhalese counterparts.  In 1976, 
the TULF was the first to demand a separate state of Tamil Eelam.  Besides citing an 
array of grievances for justification of a separate state, they cited political-economic 
disenfranchisement, intentional altering of demographics in Tamil-dominated areas, 
restriction to higher education and governmental jobs, and most alarming, ethnic 
cleansing.  Although the TULF was the first to make their demands on the Sinhalese 
government (which was ignored), it was the LTTE that would make their presence known 
to the Sinhalese government and Tamil population.102 
7. 1980s 
One of the breaking points that led to the civil war was the burning of the Jaffna 
Municipal Library with 100,000 ancient and rare Tamil documents in 1981.  No one was 
held accountable from the Sinhalese.  Another was the 1983 riots (from the first LTTE 
actions), in which the Sinhalese government allowed heinous atrocities towards innocent 




                                                 
101 Brown and Ganguly, Fighting Words: Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Asia, 132–133. 
102 Pape et al., Cutting the Fuse, 290. 
 30 
the Tamil population worsened due to the actions of the LTTE.  In reality, the government 
needed to inflict damage towards someone since they could not easily defeat the 
LTTE.103 
As riots in Colombo were directed at Tamils in retribution for terrorist attacks by 
LTTE, many believed that monks incited crowds to exact revenge against Tamils.  For 
the LTTE, these actions validated Sinhalese oppression; for the Sinhalese, these actions 
against the Tamils were meant to regalvanize Sinhala Buddhist nationalism.  As the 
Tamil Tigers targeted Buddhist temples and monks, Sinhalese civilians began to support 
the war against the Tamil separation and began protesting any tendency on the UNP to 
negotiate peace negotiations with Tamil insurgents.  The first Peace Accord of 1987 
acknowledged Sri Lanka as a multiethnic and multilingual plural society.  However, the 
SLFP, MEP, and JVP decided to go against UNPs proposal, which led to the breakdown 
of talks between Tamil Tigers and Sinhala parties due to ambiguity and suspicion of 
interference from India.104 
8. 1990s 
During the 1990s, Sri Lanka witnessed a continued growth of political activism 
by Buddhist monks.  As the war between government forces and the LTTE raged on, 
Buddhist monks became more involved with the Sinhalese government.  Their protests 
against the LTTE (as well as the Tamil minority) in favor of Sinhalese rights and a pure 
Sinhalese state put the Buddhist monk community in a different light with regards to Sri 
Lankan politics.  Even with the possibility of a peace agreement with the LTTE and 
possible concessions with the Tamil population, Buddhist monks refused to back down 
on their demands of a pure Sinhalese nation with no regard to innocent Tamils who were 
either displaced or killed in the civil war.  However, it wasn’t until 2000 and beyond that 
the Sinhalese government witnessed the extent of Buddhist extremism.105 
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9. 2000 and Beyond 
The year 2000 began with Buddhist monks showing their political activism by 
staging a ―fasting until death‖ in opposition to the Seventeenth Amendment to the Sri 
Lankan Constitution.  The monks were loosely affiliated with the Sinhala Urumaya 
(Sinhala Heritage) and other nationalist groups in Sri Lanka.  The amendment was a 
reform package, which meant devolution of power from the central government to 
provincial administration (which would favor many minorities).  However, the fasting 
and pressure from Buddhist monks made the Sinhalese government cave in to their 
demands.106 
In May 2000, monks urged the government to spurn negotiations with the Tamil 
Tigers and crush them with military force with the belief that the Buddhist religion and 
the Sinhala race were under siege from barbaric hordes.  Many blamed Sri Lankan 
politicians for the military defeats.  They believed that Sri Lanka's main political parties 
have given up too much to the Tamil minority and that it was their corruption and 
venality that brought the country to its current bloody impasse.107 
In August 2004, with the debate in Sri Lanka over the right of the Buddhist clergy 
to enter politics, a new controversy was created by a group of Buddhist monk-MPs who 
proposed laws to ban religious conversions.  One of the main planks of the nine Buddhist 
monk-MPs representing the National Heritage Party (JHU) attempted to stop what they 
called widespread conversion of Buddhists by fundamentalist Christians.  The JHU stated 
that they were forced into politics due to the inability of politicians to tackle the serious 
erosion of cultural values precipitated by a liberalized economy, rising corruption, sexual 
violence in society, and unethical conversions of Buddhists.108 
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In June 2005, the deputy leader of the JHU, who was also parliamentarian monk, 
along with Dhambra Amila, JVP member and president of the National Sagha front, 
fasted to death in protest of the post Tsunami aid sharing with the Tamil Tigers.109  In 
November 2005, Sinhala Buddhist monks aligned behind Prime Minister Mahinda 
Rajapakse during the presidential elections.  Rajapakse had entered into an alliance with 
the Jathika Hela Urumaya, or National Heritage Party (JHU), led by Buddhist monks.  
The proselytizing Christian evangelists and the activities of aid and welfare agencies 
among poor Buddhist communities alarmed Buddhist monks which led to them entering 
parliament on JHU tickets.110 
In 2007, the government, with the monks' support, was pressing a military 
campaign against Tamil rebels, scoring a string of victories, particularly on the contested 
and strategic eastern coast. Venerable Athuraliye Rathana (whose party in Parliament 
held nine seats) stated, ''We have been not just preaching. We have been fighting.‖   
Asked about the involvement of Buddhist clerics in affairs of the state, he stated, ''Is 
politics polluted?  Was Mao Zedong polluted?...Was Mahatma Gandhi polluted?''111   
From the earliest Buddhist revival led by Olcott, The Sinhala Only Act by 
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, and the continued rise of Buddhist monks in Sinhala politics, all 
of these actions led to the breakdown of a peaceful coexistence between the Sinhalese 
and Tamil population.  Those actions were galvanized by a Buddhist clergy who used 
their religious position among the Sinhalese majority to influence Sri Lankan politics.  
What they saw as a way to promote Sinhalese nationalism masked their true intent: to 
marginalize and control the Tamil minority by eliminating their chance of upward 
mobility in Sri Lanka.  These actions only created hostility as well as revolutionary 
groups, most notably the LTTE. 
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E. THE LTTE 
Originally named the Tamil New Tigers in 1972, the LTTE was founded by 
Velupilli Prabhaharan in 1976.  His first act of terrorism was assassinating a pro-
government mayor in Jaffna (informal Tamil capital) in 1975.112  This new organization 
was to become the principal military organization which dedicated itself to creating an 
independent Tamil Eelam.  What the Sinhalese did not realize was the extent to which 
audacity and fanaticism for independence that this group would inflict on the country for 
almost thirty years.113 
Unlike their Sinhalese counterparts, the LTTE has no secular agenda.  Their 
primary goal is to establish an independent state in the northern and eastern region of Sri 
Lanka, Tamil Eelam.  Although not religious in their mission, they do adhere to four 
―Thimpu Principles‖ (or cardinal rules) that were submitted to the Sri Lankan 
government in 1985.  The four rules include recognition of: 
1. Tamils of Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality.   
2. An indentified Tamil homeland and the guarantee of its territorial 
integrity.   
3. The inalienable right of self-determination of the Tamil people.   
4. The right to full citizenship and other fundamental democratic rights of all 
Tamils who look upon the island as their country.114 
The year 1983 marked the first violent actions of the LTTE in which they 
assaulted an Army camp that killed thirteen soldiers.  Once this action concluded, the 
Sinhalese government realized that the LTTE was a legitimate threat.  Not only did their 
violent actions target the Sinhalese forces, but politicians, police, and Tamils that were 
considered collaborators.  Once word was passed of the attack on the Sinhalese 
compound, anti-Tamil riots broke out in the countryside in which hundreds of Tamils 
were killed, and hundreds of homes and business were destroyed.  The passing of the 
                                                 
112 Anderson, ―Death of the Tiger,‖ 45. 
113 Pape et al, Cutting the Fuse, 286. 
114 Ibid., 291–292. 
 34 
Prevention of Terrorism Act by the Sinhalese government to suppress terrorist acts by the 
Tamil Tigers did not prevent numerous atrocities against Tamil civilians.115 
At one time there were as many as thirty-seven militant Tamil groups in Sri 
Lanka.  By 1983, the LTTE grew from fifty to over three-thousand active guerilla 
fighters.   Like any other group, the LTTE had rivals such as the Tamil Eelam Liberation 
Organization (TELO), People’s Liberation organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), and 
the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRLF).  However, by 1986 the LTTE 
eliminated any rival group by killing leadership as well as militants supporting their 
groups cause to establish their role as the dominant Tamil militant group in Sri Lanka.  
1986 also marked the beginning of LTTE’s most potent weapon against the Sinhalese: 
suicide terrorism.116 
As previously mentioned, the LTTE began as a conventional military 
organization.  However, the LTTE became more effective in their war against the 
Sinhalese with suicide attacks.  Although the LTTE were inspired (and trained) by the 
Hezbollah, they would develop their own system of planning and execution of their 
suicide bombing operations that would even inspire groups like Al Qaeda in carrying out 
similar suicide attacks.  Suicide bombings, as well as political assassinations, were 
carried out by the ―Black Tigers‖ which used suicide belts, boats (Sea Tigers), Planes 
(Air Tigers), and vehicles (scooters as well).117  Table 1 shows the number of suicide 
bombings during the Eelam Wars and the casualties associated with them. 
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Table 1.   LTTE Suicide Attacks in the Context of the Sri Lankan War118 
Table 1 only explains the suicide operations that were conducted during the 
Eelam Wars in Sri Lanka.  However, it does not cover the total loss of life from terrorist 
operations that the LTTE conducted against the Sinhalese Security Forces.  Table 2  
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Period Key Events Attacks  Killed 
Eelam War I, 1983-87 
Sri Lankan Offensive to take Jaffna halted by 
pressure from India, IPKF occupies northern 
province (1987) 1 40 
Indian Intervention, 1987-90 
Civil war suspended, LTTE fights war with 
IPKF 0 0 
Eelam War II, 1990-94 
IPKF withdraws (1990), renewed fighting 
between LTTE and Sri Lanka ends in stalemate  15 402 
Eelam War III, 1995-2001 
Sri Lanka takes Jaffna (1995), fails to secure 
overland supply route 62 722 
Cease fire agreement 2002-
2005 
Norway brokers peace deal leading to cease 
fire agreement (2002), LTTE splits (2004) 1 5 
Eelam War IV, 2006-2009 
Sri Lankan Forces take Eastern Province 
(2008), central Northern Province (2008), 
defeats LTTE (2009) 37 474 
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162 784 2,845 3,791 
2001  
89 412 1,321 1,822 
2002  
14 1 0 15 
2003  
31 2 26 59 
2004  
33 7 69 109 
2005  
153 90 87 330 
2006  
981 826 2,319 4,126 
2007  
525 499 3,333 4,357 
2008  
439 1,286 9,536 11,261 
2009  
11,111 1,315 3,139 15,565 
2010  
0 0 0 0 
2011**  
0 0 0 0 
Total  13,538 5,222 22,675 41,435 
*Data since March 14, 2000  
**Data till February 13, 2011 
Table 2.   Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Sri Lanka Since March 2000119 
On January 10, 2008, the FBI reported that ―The LTTE is one of the most 
dangerous and deadly extremist outfits in the world and the world should be concerned 
about other organizations they inspired including the al-Qaeda in Iraq.‖120  The LTTE 
was also the first to use women, as well as children, in their suicide bombing operations.  
The LTTE women were called ―Birds of Freedom‖ and carried out 30-percent of their 
suicide bombing attacks during 1987–2000.121  Children were also recruited heavily in 
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orphanages by having shrines of martyrs set up where they could see them daily in order 
to entice them into joining LTTE suicide operations.122 
The LTTE infiltrated the education system by gaining access to schools in order to 
recruit students who were more than willing to participate in conventional and suicide 
operations.  LTTE members would take over classes to indoctrinate children into their 
ideology which lead to new membership.123  ―Vani‖ joined the LTTE when he was 13.  
Although his family was unhappy with his decision, the LTTE not only educated him in 
understanding Tamil history, but he was trained by the LTTE as a computer programmer, 
whose mission was to translate books and literature from other languages into Tamil.124  
This example challenges the theory that secular education would deter individuals from 
committing or being involved in terrorist activities.  Innocent Tamils were being 
subjected to numerous atrocities by government forces, including the raping of women, 
systematic executions of Tamil males, and burning of Tamil villages.  These actions not 
only galvanized support and recruits for the LTTE, but gained international attention for 
human rights violations by the Sinhalese.125 
With regards to recruitment into the LTTE, the prolonged civil war provided 
economic incentives for individuals to join.  Educated Tamils had little chance of earning 
a good living due to more than half of the job opportunities being given to the Sinhalese, 
which in turn made many youths forsake furthering their education in order to join the 
ranks of the LTTE.  As farming was beginning to be the only source of income to the 
Tamils, the land distribution scheme by the Sinhalese insured that the income was 
minimal while the Sinhalese reaped the benefits.  Although there are currently college 
students at Batticaloa, Malavai, and Tricomalee, many have doubts for productive futures 
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while international organizations and NGOs, such as CARE, are attempting to help Tamil 
students prepare for an uncertain future in an unstable country.126   
On May 20, 2009, the Sinhalese Army entered the garrison town of Paranthan and 
captured Kilinochchi, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) political and 
administrative headquarters, which officially ended the Eelam War IV.  This followed the 
May 18
th
 deaths of LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran, LTTE intelligence unit chief 
Pottu Amman, and Sea Tigers’ (sea wing of the LTTE) chief Soosai.  The government 
then announced its ―humanitarian mission‖ to liberate civilians held hostage in a human 
shield by the LTTE for in Mullaitivu.127  
On May 22, 2009, the United Nations disclosed that between 80,000 and 100,000 
people had been killed in the war since 1983.  In one offensive from August 2006 to May 
2009, 6,261 Security Force (SF) personnel, policemen and paramilitary troopers had been 
killed and 29,551 wounded. Since 1981, 23,790 SF personnel had been killed in the war.  
In 2008, the LTTE had revealed that the rebels had lost more than 22,000 cadres since the 
first guerrilla death in November 1982.128 
Although the LTTE has been defeated, the Sri Lankan government must answer 
to the State Departments report of three hundred incidents of abuse as well as suspicion 
of violations of international humanitarian law.  The government has also been suspected 
of showing no interest of investigating war crimes, which has caused many in the 
international community to push an independent investigation without Sinhalese 
permission.  If the Sinhalese government continues this path of non-compliance, it only 
solidifies the suspicion of war crimes by government forces.129 
There is no doubt that the LTTE (and other Tamil extremist groups) needs to be 
held accountable for their actions towards the Sinhalese government and civilian 
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population.  However, in proportionality, the Tamil population has suffered the most 
since post-colonization from the Sinhalese majority.  Even with that fact alone, the 
Sinhalese will continue to use the LTTE’s past actions on Buddhist monks, civilians, and 
government officials as a way to hinder any peaceful settlement with the Tamil’s.  It also 
does not help that Buddhist extremism will continue to influence Sinhalese politics. 
Muthiah Alagappa viewed the state of Sri Lanka as ―incapable of ensuring their 
security.‖  From a Tamil’s perspective, issues include: dealing with the security forces, 
name and birthplace as a source of suspicion, and, worst of all, not being accepted as 
citizen of Sri Lanka.  For the Sinhalese prospective, their concerns have to deal with the 
current, political, and ethnic problems.  Many from both sides feel that their homes are 
the last bastion from violence.  However, their own homes can be targets from both the 
Sinhalese and Tamil extremists, which lead many to flee to other countries.130 
F. SRI LANKA’S EDUCATION SYSTEM 
According to the World Bank:  
Sri Lanka’s Primary school completion rates increased from 90% to 95%; 
which meant that 100,000 more students completed primary school each 
year, using a modernized curriculum with child-friendly learning. 200,000 
more students completed grade 9 each year (up from 59% in 1996 to 78% 
in 2004), with gender parity.‖131   
Currently, Sri Lanka’s literacy rate (defined by the CIA as individuals who are 
fifteen and over can read and write) are 92.3% male, 89.1% female and total population is 
90.7%.132  In 2007, Sri Lanka led all of South Asia in secondary (62.4% to 52.3%) and 
tertiary (18.2% to 11.4%) gross enrollment.133 
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Sri Lanka designed a new Education Sector Development Framework and 
Program (ESDFP) based on a five year rolling plan. The initiatives included: an increase 
equitable access to basic and secondary education, promoting education quality, 
enhancing the economic efficiency and equity of resource allocation and distribution, and 
strengthening education governance and service delivery.  The World Bank is supporting 
the ESDFP through the US $60 million Education Sector Development Project (ESDP), 
which adopts a sector-wide approach. The ESDP became effective in February 2006, and 
has made satisfactory progress for Sri Lanka.134 
The above figures show the progression of Sri Lanka’s education programs.  
However, the fact remains that these figures do not hide the scars that the Eelam wars 
inflicted for both the Sinhala and Tamils.  Even with the World Bank’s (as well as other 
international and NGOs) continued support for the education system, Sri Lanka still has 
to deal with its internal ethnic and religious strife caused by civil war.  Showing progress 
for education in the South Asia region does not hide the reality of ethnic cleansing, 
marginalization, and racism towards the Tamil minority.  
G. CONCLUSION  
For the Sinhalese, Buddhist extremists viewed the Tamils as a hindrance to their 
goals of Sinhalese nationalism.  The Language Act passed by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, 
which was supposed to promote Sinhalese nationalism, was ultimately the beginning of 
marginalization of the Tamil minority.  Prior to the standardization of university 
qualification exams, the Tamil minority dominated and excelled in the universities and 
were more than qualified to attend them.  As marginalization continued, more atrocities 
by the Sinhalese were inflicted on the Tamil’s, which lead to the formation of Tamil 
extremist groups.  As Tamil extremists began fighting back, the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act (which was to prevent terrorism in Sri Lanka) only led to innocent Tamils becoming 
victims of Sinhalese retribution and ultimately to civil war. 
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For the Tamils, the conflict with the Sinhalese came about not from a lack of 
education, but from opportunities for jobs and Sinhalese-only testing and quota systems 
for universities that were imposed by the Sinhalese government.  This led to Tamil 
extremist groups, like the LTTE, which began as student movements that pushed for 
Tamil equality.  It was only when marginalization and violence continued towards the 
Tamils that groups like the LTTE began their violent struggle for a separate state of 
Tamil Eelam.  The LTTE started as a small organization which grew to be the most 
effective and deadliest terrorist group in the world.  The LTTE infiltrated the education 
system and recruited women and children and made them more effective in their suicide 
bombing operations. Even with their defeat in 2009, there are still a small number of 
members as well as supporters to the LTTE.  If there are no favorable concessions 
between the Sinhalese and Tamils, there is a strong likelihood that another Eelam War 
will occur in Sri Lanka in the near future. 
This historical example of Sri Lanka disproves the notion that a well-educated 
society would be free of conflict.  Sri Lanka gives credence to the theory that an educated 
society like the Tamils understood their plight in Sri Lanka and made attempts to improve 
their status among the Sinhalese majority.  However, memories of favoritism by the 
British that gave educational and socioeconomic advantages to the Tamils drove 
Sinhalese nationalists to oppress the Tamil population.  This only led to further 
marginalization, violence, and worst of all, a civil war that brought about the most deadly 
terrorist organization in the world—the LTTE.    
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III. TERRORIST EVENTS CARRIED OUT BY EDUCATED 
INDIVIDUALS 
The profile of eleven individuals that conducted terrorist activities highlights the 
importance of initiating reform that focuses on macro political economic conditions in the 
country.  In this chapter, the author will provide evidence that those eleven individuals 
did not come from poor, uneducated, and displaced backgrounds, but from varied 
educated and economic backgrounds.  Regardless of religion, economic, social, and 
ethnic background, these individuals were recruited, trained, and indoctrinated by groups 
like Hamas and Al-Qaida to carry out terrorist operations.  This chapter will show that 
other causal factors besides education led to their participation in terrorist activities.  By 
doing this, the author will illustrate the importance of focusing on promoting educational 
institutions that are suited for the local setting as part of reform that is at the macro level 
rather than secular education that may be a foreign product and may lead to uneven 
demand and development, creating a setting for further discontent.  
On September 11, 2001, nineteen individuals hijacked four commercial planes 
and proceeded to commit the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history that killed over 3,000 
people in New York City, Washington D.C. and Pennsylvania.135  This event ultimately 
led to the present war in Iraq and Afghanistan.  It was weeks after the attacks that the 
background and nationality of the individuals that participated in the 9/11 attacks became 
apparent and shed a new light on who was involved.  Prior to 9/11, most Americans 
assumed that those involved in those attacks were uneducated and poor Muslim males 
from Islamic countries.  The leaders who commanded this operation and those who 
executed the operation illustrated how terrorism has been misunderstood.   
A. MOHAMED ATTA (9/11)  
Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed Atta led the attacks on September 11, 2001.  
His actions included gathering his team in Hamburg, Germany, pilot training in Florida, 
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and dry runs as passengers from Logan Airport prior to 9/11.  His leadership and strict 
adherence to the mission of Jihad against the U.S. insured that three of the four planes 
that Atta and his teams hijacked accomplished what many thought would be impossible 
on U.S. soil.136  Mohamed Atta was from Cairo, Egypt.  He graduated from Cairo 
University in 1986 with a degree in architecture.  After a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1995, he 
became active in Muslim extremist activities and made contact with Al-Qaeda recruiters, 
who at the time were looking for ―intelligent and dedicated‖ individuals for their 
operations.137  Al-Qaeda agents saw his educational background and commitment to 
radical Islam as the key to his recruitment, which would focus his mission to lead the 
9/11 attacks on the U.S.138  However, there is more to this story of Atta that provides 
insight into how this man led the largest terrorist attack on U.S. soil. 
Family and friends described Atta as a shy, unassuming young man who struggled 
to make his mark.  Born in Kafr El Sheikh, Mohamed was the son of a lawyer and a 
homemaker. His father characterized him as one who liked to play chess and disliked 
violent games.  Viewed as scrawny (5 ft. 7 in.), thin and called ―Bolbol,‖ by his father 
(Arabic slang for a little singing bird), Atta seemed overshadowed by his two sisters, a 
zoology professor and a doctor, respectively.  His Cairo University peers viewed him as 
an average student.139 
Atta made few friends in school, and with regards to politics and religion, he 
offered only mainstream opinions. What baffled his few friends and classmates was that 
his first impressions of Islamic terrorists initially were ―brainless and irresponsible 
people.‖140  Due to lack of jobs in Cairo, Atta enrolled in the Technical University of 
Hamburg-Harburg, in northern Germany in 1992, with the goal of earning a degree in 
urban planning and then returning to Egypt.  There, in 1993, he met Volker Hauth (a 
fellow student).  Over the next few years they would travel and study together. Hauth was 
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the first to notice the Atta’s change from meek in Cairo to a rigid individual in Germany.  
Hauth characterized Mohamed as ―a guy searching for justice‖ as well as ―offended by 
this broad wrong direction the world was taking.‖141 
By the mid-'90s, Atta began disappearing from school as well as his job at a 
Hamburg consultancy for extended periods of time for either thesis work or a pilgrimage 
to Mecca (claimed by Atta).  From mid-1997 to October 1998, Atta seemed to have 
disappeared from Hamburg entirely for ―family reasons.‖  But it is clear that during this 
time his transformation from aloof individual to extremist began.  Returning to Germany 
with a bushy beard favored by fundamentalists, he was more serious with his new-found 
zeal towards Islam while losing touch with old friends he made prior to his extended 
absences.  With a sullen view of having any prospect of having a promising future in 
Egypt, Atta (believed by German authorities) began touching base with a wide range of 
people connected to terrorism, most notably a Syrian businessman named Mamoun 
Darkazanli, who had power of attorney for a German bank account in the name of a man 
thought to be Osama bin Laden's finance chief.142  
Whatever he was doing behind the scenes or meeting individuals that were 
suspected of extremist activities, Atta began preaching the word of the Koran.  In 1999, 
university officials gave him permission to form an Islamic student group; it was here, 
investigators believe, that he met future hijackers Marwan Al-Shehhi and Ziad Samir 
Jarrah.  The group of about forty members gathered to pray every day led by Atta.  This 
was the beginning of how a meek boy from the Cairo had grown to a devout Muslim, 
surrounding himself with like-minded individuals, some of whom would follow him to 
train for and carry out the 9/11 attacks.143   
It is clear from this short story of Atta that from the beginning he was pressured to 
succeed by his upbringing and lack of self-esteem in the presence of his own sisters only 
compounded his psyche.  Atta was a man that could not find that niche that would make 
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him feel complete in the presence of his father, who did not help his self-image by giving 
him a nick-name fitting for a little bird.  It was only when he left home, got involved with 
Muslim extremists, and became a very devout Muslim in search for justice that Atta 
became empowered with a sense of belonging and found himself on a mission to wage 
Jihad against those who attack Islam.  
B. FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBERS IN PALESTINE IN 2002–2003 
Wafa Idris, Henadi Tayseer Jaradat, Dareen Abu Aisheh, and Ayat Akhras were 
the first female suicide bombers in Palestine.  Their actions killed twenty-five Israeli’s 
and wounded nearly 240 more.144  These actions sent a shockwave not only in Israel, but 
around the world by how Islamic extremism included females in a male-dominated 
political movement.  These women did not simply decide one day to approach an Islamic 
fundamentalist group and volunteer to be suicide bombers.  All of these women had 
reasons that pushed them to become suicide bombers.  The lack of educational 
opportunities was not the reason for becoming suicide bombers.  These women were 
bright and intelligent individuals with promising careers; however, personal experiences 
and external factors pushed them to end their lives abruptly by sacrificing themselves in 
the name of Islam.   
On January 27, 2002, Idris, a paramedic for the Red Crescent, detonated herself in 
a shopping district in Jerusalem on Jaffa Rd.  Two were killed and over 150 were 
wounded.145  Her actions earned her the title of a modern day Jeanne d’Arc to being 
compared to Jesus Christ (by Dr. Adel Sadeq, head of Psychiatry at Cairo’s Ein Shams 
University), and Saddam Hussein erected a memorial in her honor.146  Regardless of 
whether her actions galvanized the Palestinian resistance or not, it is important to 
understand why she decided to sacrifice herself in such a manner. 
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In Wafa’s, being exposed to the early struggles against Israeli occupation started 
early for her.  It is easy to assume that she was exposed to violence and witnessed friends 
and relatives being harassed and humiliated by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).  However, 
by the age twelve, witnessing a friend losing an eye by the IDF was the breaking point for 
her that would begin her path leading to that fateful day in 2002.  Although many of her 
own relatives believed that she would never want to be a martyr, they do believe that her 
upbringing in her young adult life and subsequent marriage at a young age may have 
been the driving factors that drove her to be one.147   
In 1991, Wafa (at age 16), married her first cousin.  Although the marriage was 
amicable, she was unable to have any children which drove her husband to divorce her 
nine years later.  After being told by a local doctor that she would never be able to carry a 
baby full term, she was forced to live with her family.  To make matters worse, her 
husband took another wife and a year later had their first child.  These actions drove her 
to work as a volunteer at the Red Crescent, helping those who were wounded by the 
IDF.148 
Working at the Red Crescent was her only refuge from the humiliation of a failed 
marriage and being unable to bear children.  Being a financial burden on her family and 
not being able to remarry, Mira Tzoreff (Professor at Ben Gurian University) believes 
that her situation made it easier for recruiters from extremist groups to approach her with 
the promise for financial support for her family.  Having no future as a Muslim female in 
the case of Wafa Idris probably made the search for the first female suicide bomber an 
easy one for any group in Palestine.  The promise of financial and spiritual reward to 
families of martyrs made it much easier for women like Idris to step forward and support 
their cause.149  
 
                                                 
147 Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers 
(Emmaus, PA: Rodale, 2003), 40. 
148 Ibid., 42–51. 
149 Skaine, Female Suicide Bombers, 138. 
 48 
Henadi Tayseer Jaradat, a law student from Jenin, walked into a Maxim 
Restaurant in Haifa, Israel, and blew herself up, killing twenty-one and wounding sixty 
on October 4, 2003.  She was known as religious, prayed daily and read the Quran.  She 
was also described as a determined and self-confident woman focused in achieving her 
goals while pursuing success and high achievements.150  A promising law career and a 
stable income that was to follow by being a lawyer did not prevent her from being the 
second suicide bomber for the Islamic Jihad.151  
For Jaradat, it was she, not her brother, who was responsible for the family’s 
income since her father was being treated for cancer.  In service for her family, she 
postponed her own marriage so her brother would marry first, then she would marry her 
fiancé.  However, both her brother and her fiancé were soon killed by Israeli forces, 
which left her alone seeking for revenge against those who pretty much ruined her life 
and left her with no family and no one to marry.  For Jaradat, this was pure revenge, and 
for the Islamic Jihad, it was another recruit for their suicide operations.152 
Dareen Abu Aisheh, a student at Al-Najah University, blew herself up at an 
Israeli checkpoint in the West Bank on February 27, 2002, wounding two.  Unlike Idris 
and Jaradat before her, she willingly went to Hamas to volunteer but was turned down.  
Undaunted, she then went to the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade where they obliged her request 
to be another shahida.  Although viewed by her parents as religious, her motivation was 
in response to a gun battle in which Israeli troops killed four armed Arabs for an earlier 
attack on an Israeli that was politically motivated.153 
Ayat Akhras was a student and engaged to be married from Dehaishe refugee 
camp near Bethlehem.  On March 29, 2002, she walked into Kyriat Hayoval, a Jerusalem 
supermarket, and killed herself along with two others, wounding twenty-eight more.  This 
attack by Akhras was in response to Passover attacks on Arafat’s headquarters.  Her 
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taped statement before she died heard her saying, ―I am going to fight instead of the 
sleeping Arab armies who are watching Palestinian girls fighting alone.‖154 
For Ayat, her hate for the Israeli’s motivated her to become a journalist so she 
could communicate to the world about the injustice of the Palestinians.  Remembered as 
observant but not fanatically religious, she was enamored with western-style clothes that 
she would wear to school.  Being bound only to home and school due to the restriction 
that Israelis imposed on her refugee camp, her parents introduced her to a young Shadi 
Abu Laban who took a hiatus from college to earn a living for his family.  Ayat and 
Shadi were inseparable and were soon engaged to be married.  Her goals were to have a 
traditional wedding and afterwards enroll in Bethlehem University to study journalism 
and work as a correspondent in the West Bank in support of the Palestinian cause.155  
Although Ayat had dreams of marriage and a bright future seemed in reach for her 
and her fiancé, two major events changed her way of life forever.  First, her father was 
working for an Israeli company during the second Intifada of 2000.  During that time, her 
father, as well as the rest of the family, was the target of threats and harassment from 
their own people because of the fathers ties with Israelis.  What her father saw working to 
support his family to make sure there was food on the table (in which he was working for 
the same Jewish company for nearly thirty years) was viewed as traitorous against the 
Palestinian cause.  For Ayat, she viewed these actions directed towards her family as a 
loss of honor in the community.156 
Second, she witnessed her neighbors (one of the leaders of the al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigade, Jamil Qassas) brother shot and killed by Israeli soldiers.  At the funeral of her 
neighbors’ brother, she approached him believing that this event changed everything and 
it was a sign from Allah that she had to convince her father and the others that any 
contact with the Jews only meant bloodshed.  With the harassment getting worse from 
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neighbors, merchants not serving their family, and her father being forced to be a prisoner 
in his own home so he couldn’t work for Jews, Ayat decided to act.157 
Ayat decided to approach the al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade to become a suicide 
bomber.  By sacrificing herself, she believed that the harassment would stop so her 
family could live a normal life among their own people without fear or disgrace.  
Motivated by the murder of an innocent boy at the hands of the Israelis and her family 
situation, Ayat recorded her last message at the home of one of the leaders of the al-Aqsa 
Martyr’s Brigade at seven o’clock in the morning on March 29, 2002.  No one in her 
family knew that before her own wedding, Ayat was to become another shahida.158 
For these four women, secular education did not prevent them from becoming 
suicide bombers.  These women were driven by the loss of a loved one, witnessing a 
death of another, harassment by the Israelis as well as their own people, and in the case of 
Ayat, an end to harassment to her family in order to earn respect from the community.  
These four women were unfazed by their decisions, and understood the consequences and 
believed that their actions were the only way to fight back.  These individuals were not 
influenced by a madrasa education or some radical cleric on television, as many 
westerners would believe.  However, their constant exposure to harassment, 
marginalization, and racism by the IDF at an early age led them to finally give into 
violence as a way of not only helping the cause of their own people but a sense of 
vengeance against their oppressors as well. 
C. MUNICH OLYMPIC GAMES 1972 
In the early hours of September 5, 1972, eight terrorists from the Palestinian 
group Black September made their way into the athlete’s village and, after killing two 
Israeli’s, barricaded themselves in their quarters with nine additional Israeli hostages.  
After seventeen hours of unsuccessful negotiations, German authorities attempted a 
rescue mission, in which all nine Israeli athletes were killed in the firefight.  Meanwhile, 
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three surviving terrorists were released and flown to Libya and welcomed as heroes.159  
This action that led to one of the most shocking events in Olympic Games history was 
coordinated and planned by Mohammad Dauoud Oudeh and Ali Hassan Salameh. 
Mohammed Oudeh, the self-proclaimed mastermind of the kidnapping and 
murder of the Israeli athletes in Munich, claimed that he created the plan with Palestinian 
colleagues in Rome.  Oudeh was from the Silwan quarter of East Jerusalem, where he 
taught mathematics and physics to Palestinian schoolchildren and qualified to work as a 
lawyer.  He remained in Silwan until the 1967 war.  After relocating to Amman, he 
joined the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and assisted in the formation of the 
PLO security apparatus in 1968.  In a 2006 interview with the Associated Press prior to 
his death, Abu Daoud justified the actions in Munich by stating, ―Before Munich we were 
simply terrorists.  After Munich, at least people started asking, who are these terrorists 
and what motivated them? Before Munich nobody had the slightest idea about 
Palestine.‖160 
Although Oudeh might have masterminded the Munich Games massacre, it was 
Salameh who executed the plan.  A trusted lieutenant to Yasser Arafat and of the PLO, 
his coordination with Black September ensured the raid’s success leading to the deaths of 
the eleven Israeli athletes.   
Ali Hassan Salameh was born in 1942 as a son of a prominent gang leader in 
Palestine, who was notorious for his actions in the Jewish-Arab riots in the 1930s.  His 
father was killed during a battle in a village against Israeli forces; Ali was only 6 years 
old.  Unlike other Palestinians who lived in refugee camps, Salameh’s family was rich 
and Ali initially had no interest in politics.  He went to Germany to study engineering.  
However, this future right hand of Arafat did not start off right away as a 
revolutionary.161 
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In the beginning, Salameh was enamored with the European ways of life 
including restaurants, nightclubs, dress, and women.  Although pressured by his mother 
to move back to Egypt, Salameh was still clinging on to the European party scene.  It was 
here that Salameh understood his duties not only to Palestine but living up to his father’s 
legacy.  Salameh, in an interview with Nadia Salti Stephan in 1976, understood that he 
was born and raised to carry the Palestinian cause.  Salameh understood that as a son of a 
well known revolutionary, he had no choice but to follow his father’s example.  Once 
Salameh joined the PLO, his rise came with ease from Arafat, which led to Black 
September’s attack in Munich.162  
The Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, made Salameh their primary target 
when operation Wrath of God was approved by Golda Meir.  However, numerous 
attempts to kill him led to failures.163  Undaunted by their past failures, the Mossad 
continued to monitor Salameh.  On January 22, 1979, Salameh’s convoy was hit by a 
high explosive bomb inside of a parked Volkswagen right next to the apartment that 
Erika Chambers, the English woman assigned to follow Salameh by Mossad rented at 
3:45 P.M.  Six years after the beginning of Operation Wrath of God, Salameh was dead; 
the Munich athletes were finally avenged.164  Salameh from day one knew his mission 
and his position in the Palestine struggle against Israel.  Although educated in Europe and 
enamored with western decadence, he understood and believed that his goal in life was to 
follow in his father’s footsteps as well as dying for the cause of freedom in Palestine. 
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D. THEODORE JOHN “TED” KACZYNSKI, “THE UNABOMBER” 1978–
1985  
For seventeen years, Kaczynski was remembered for sending well-concealed pipe 
bombs through the mail, or planted at universities, corporate and government facilities, 
and their personnel, causing many injuries and deaths.165  Before he was apprehended by 
a federal task force, his rampage on U.S. soil left three dead and twenty-three 
wounded.166  Prior to his arrest in 1996, Kaczynski was able to avoid detection by 
various methods, including: wearing double-soled tennis shoes that left an impression of 
footprints that would be different from his actual shoe size, several pairs of aviation 
sunglasses as a form of disguise when mailing his bombs, and using human hair from a 
bathroom and placing it in-between two pieces of electrical tape to mislead forensic 
scientists by finding DNA to link a particular individual to the bomb.167  Long before 
9/11, the U.S. was in the hunt for one man that spread terror throughout the countryside. 
Ted Kaczynski was from Chicago and a son of a sausage factory worker.  He 
graduated high school at age sixteen and earned a National Merit Scholarship to Harvard 
University.  After earning his B.S. in mathematics in 1962, he continued his education at 
the University of Michigan, earning his M.A. in 1965 and Ph.D. in 1967.  After 
graduation, he accepted the position of assistant professor of mathematics at the 
University of Berkley.  In 1969, after having success as a teacher and researcher towards 
his tenure, Kaczynski abruptly resigned his position and moved with his brother David to 
Montana.168 
It was in Montana that Kaczynski began his rage against society.  The final 
breaking point for him that led to his seventeen-year bombing campaign was when a 
logging road was constructed near his cabin.  On May 25, 1978, Kaczynski’s first bomb 
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injured a security guard at Northwestern University.  His last bomb in 1995 killed 
California Forestry Association president, Gilbert P. Murray, in Sacramento, California.  
In 1995, Kaczynski sent a 35,000-word manifesto to the Washington Post, which voiced 
his complaints on society and its devotion to technology, while threatening to carry out 
more bombings if it was not published.  In the end, it was his brother, not the FBI, or any 
federal agency, that led to the apprehension of Kaczynski.169  If not for his brothers 
informing federal agents that he was the Unabomber, Kaczynski may have eluded capture 
for several more years.170 
Clearly, Kaczynski had a severe mental disorder that was well-concealed in the 
mind of a prodigy.  It was discovered that Kaczynski’s early life was a prelude to his 
demise later in his adult years.  Two key events that led to his depression and self 
loathing were skipping from fifth to the seventh grade (which led to his social 
awkwardness with older kids), and seeking psychiatric counseling at the University of 
Michigan that involved fantasies of becoming a female.  It was during this second event 
that he had his first urge to kill (the psychiatrist who evaluated him) and that he did not 
care anymore about consequences of future actions now that his self-revelation gave him 
freedom to do anything without fear of death.171 
For Kaczynski, his experiences as a child and adult led to his future terrorist 
actions that shocked the U.S. and baffled federal agents for almost twenty years.  
Whatever pushed him to the brink led him to that little cabin in Montana where he finally 
made true on his threats of death and destruction.  He hoped that all his bombs succeeded 
in injuring or killing someone during his reign of terror.  One phrase that summed up his 
rage and his quest for justice was:  
I had hoped that the victim would be blinded or have his hands blown off 
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than nothing.  But not enough to satisfy me.  Well, live and learn.  No 
more match-head bombs.  I wish I knew how to get hold of some 
dynamite.172 
E. TIMOTHY JAMES MCVEIGH, OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING, 1995  
On April 19, 1995, at 9:02 a.m., a truck full of explosives detonated outside the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.  One hundred sixty 
people were killed (nineteen of them children) and nearly six hundred more were 
wounded and injured.  Prior to 9/11, this attack was the worst in U.S. history.  The 
perpetrators were Terry Nichols and Timothy McVeigh.  Although Nichols participated 
in the planning of the bombing, it was McVeigh who drove the truck, lit the fuse, and 
walked away from the rented Ryder truck that destroyed the Murrah building.173 
Timothy McVeigh was born in Pendleton, New York, where his father worked in 
a radiator assembly plant in nearby Lockport, while his mother worked as a travel agent.  
Catholic in religious background, his mother left his father and moved to Florida, which 
negatively affected Timothy.  A good student at Starpoint High in Pendleton, he began 
having an interest in guns and being a survivalist.  After a short employment at a local 
fast food restaurant, he left his hometown to attend Bryant and Stratton College in 
Williamsville, New York, to study computer programming.  However, he left college and 
returned home after only one semester.174 
It was during this time that McVeigh began reading white supremacist William 
Pierce’s The Turner Diaries.  After a short stint at an armored car service in Buffalo, 
New York, McVeigh joined the U.S. Army on May 24, 1998.  McVeigh enjoyed early 
success as a gunner in a Bradley Fighting vehicle, as well as mastery of other weapons 
and excelling in training exercises.  In 1990, he reenlisted for another four years and rose 
in the ranks with his exceptional performance as a soldier in his unit.  In January 1991, he 
was deployed to the Persian Gulf in participation of the Gulf War against Iraq.  In Iraq, 
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he was promoted to Sergeant and performed well under fire, earning many combat 
decorations.  However, he discovered that killing others was personally hard to 
swallow.175 
Upon returning from the Gulf, McVeigh volunteered for Special Forces training.  
However, he was ill-prepared and dropped out after only two days.  This event negatively 
affected McVeigh so much that he decided to leave the Army.  While in the Army, he 
was exposed to anti-government propaganda, became a fan of the right-wing magazine 
Soldier of Fortune, continued to read and follow the guidance of the Turner Diaries, and 
briefly joined the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) where he met Terry Nichols and Michael Fortier 
who both disliked the Army and the federal government.176  
McVeigh found it very hard to adjust to civilian life after the Army.  His only 
employment was the same job that he had before joining the Army: a security guard for 
the same armored car service.  Although disgruntled about his past service in the Army, 
McVeigh did join the National Guard for extra money.  After hearing about gun control 
legislation was being under consideration by the U.S. Congress and the liberal attitudes 
of his fellow co-workers, he quit his security job and followed local gun shows and 
talking to other anti-government activists.  Over the next two years, he would attend 
about eighty gun shows.177  
The passing of the Brady Gun Control Bill and the Ruby Ridge Incident made 
McVeigh believe that the federal government was against its own citizens.  However, the 
culminating event that led to the Oklahoma City bombing was McVeigh witnessing the 
Branch Davidian Siege in Waco, Texas in 1993.  Sympathizing with the Branch 
Davidian’s, McVeigh drove to the site of the siege and even made public statements to 
support their stand against the government.  After the final confrontation between the 
Davidians and federal agents which led deaths of many followers, including children, 
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McVeigh became so obsessed with Waco that it drove him to take revenge on the U.S. 
government by targeting the nearest federal building, which was the Murrah building in 
Oklahoma City.178  
Undaunted, McVeigh and Nichols started to collect enough material to create the 
bomb that would ultimately be used at Oklahoma City.  He travelled to Kansas and Texas 
to collect ammonium nitrate and three barrels of nitro-methane fuel.  For McVeigh, this 
mission to bomb the Murrah Building was given to him by the Branch Davidians 
themselves; and most of all, no federal employee was guiltless.  His vision of punishing 
the U.S. government came to reality on April 19, 1995, two years after the Waco siege.  
McVeigh, however, was arrested that same day for a weapons charge, but wasn’t 
identified as the perpetrator until several days later.  On May 27, 1997, McVeigh was on 
trial in Colorado, and after nine weeks was found guilty and sentenced to death.  On June 
11, 2001, in Terre Haute, Indiana, McVeigh was executed by lethal injection.  In a cruel 
twist of fate, the Twin Towers in New York, The Pentagon in Washington D.C., and 
Flight 93 over Pennsylvania will occur exactly three months later, making it the worst 
attack on U.S. soil.179 
F. OSAMA BIN LADEN 
On August 17, 1998, a suicide bomber drove a truck loaded with explosives into 
the U.S. Embassy in Kenya, killing 292 (including twelve U.S. citizens) and injuring over 
5,000 more.  Nine minutes later, another truck loaded with explosives was driven into the 
U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing eleven and wounding eighty-six more.  
Al-Qaeda was responsible for both attacks. On October 18, 2001, four members in 
connection with the attacks were sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole by a federal judge in New York.180 
On October 12, 2000, off the coast of Aden, Yemen, a small boat carrying 
explosives rammed into the USS Cole.  The blast killed seventeen U.S. sailors and injured 
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thirty-nine more.  Like the Embassy bombings in both Kenya and Tanzania, Al-Qaeda 
claimed responsibility for the attack.  The mastermind behind the bombing was identified 
as Yemeni Abdul Rahman Hussein Mohammed al-Saafani, who avoided capture by 
fleeing abroad.  However, eight individuals were implicated in the attack and were put on 
trial.181 
On September 11, 2001, nineteen individuals seized four commercial jets from 
U.S. airports.  Two of them crashed into both World Trade Center Towers in New York, 
which collapsed after a few hours.  One crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., 
while the last jet prematurely crashed in a remote field in Pennsylvania due to the 
passengers and crew attacking the hijackers in a last stand.  Nearly 3,000 people were 
killed and hundreds more injured, including scores of firefighters, police, and rescue 
workers who worked frantically to save lives in New York and Washington, D.C.182 
All three attacks were connected to Osama bin Laden.  Although he did not 
participate in the events that killed many U.S. and other foreign nationals, his Al-Qaida 
organization had the funding and personnel to accomplish their mission: kill Americans 
and their allies.  Although success was achieved in Iraq, the U.S. continues to have a 
military presence there as well in Afghanistan with hopes for a decisive victory.  
Although Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. forces in Pakistan, Al-Qaida continues to 
flourish in their terrorist activities with no real end in sight. 
Osama bin Laden was one of fifty-four children of Mohamed bin Laden in Saudi 
Arabia.  His family built a ―unique and important partnership‖ with Saudi Arabia's royal 
family, engaging in an array of businesses including construction and road building.  This 
partnership meant continuous financial security for Mohamed bin Laden.  Their 
investments and land purchases in Europe, and especially the U.S. (from Florida to 
Beverly Hills), drew international attention.183 
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Osama attended Al Thagher School, which provided a British-style secular 
education with Islamic worship.  He then attended King Abdulaziz University, where he 
studied business administration.  During that time, he became deeply involved in the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which began to shape his Islamic beliefs.  As he got older and left 
the university, the distance between himself and his family widened.184 
Prior to leaving the university, bin Laden was heavily influenced by Sheik 
Abdullah Azzam, a prominent radical Muslim.  When the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan in 1979, Osama bin Laden left Saudi Arabia to join the jihad.  Bin Laden 
organized and funded mujahedeen activities including weapons, training camps, and 
infrastructure.  When his friend Abdallah Azzam was killed by a car bomb, bin Laden 
created a new Islamic network called Al-Qaeda, or the base.  The initial members were a 
collection of thousands of radical Muslims that he and Azzam had already trained 
throughout the years.185  
Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia in 1990, where he spoke critically of the 
government at various mosques and public gatherings.  When the U.S. invaded Kuwait, 
bin Laden accused the Saudi government of an act against Islam by supporting U.S. 
military operations against Iraq.  These actions led to the permanent separation between 
bin Laden and his family, as well as the Saudi royal family.  With his inheritance, he then 
moved to Sudan and invested in local businesses.  However, he also funded terrorist 
training camps that sent fighters to the Balkans, Chechnya, and other areas where 
Muslims were in conflict.186 
The Saudi government finally froze his assets in 1993 which were valued at $200 
million.  Bin Laden renounced his Saudi citizenship which made him a renegade not only 
to his country but to his family who at the same time did not want to associate with him 
or his terrorist activities.  During this time, Bin Laden began targeting the U.S., most 
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notably the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 in which six were killed and 1,000 
were wounded or injured.  Although it was not proven that bin Laden was the architect of 
the bombing, the perpetrator was Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, who was a guest in bin Laden’s 
house in Pakistan.187  
As bin Laden continued attacks on Americans and other nationalities, Washington 
began to pressure Sudan to revoke its protection of bin Laden.  This then prompted bin 
Laden to move to Afghanistan, where his new headquarters and operations flourish today.  
Officially, on August 23, 1996, bin Laden declared jihad against Americans and Jews 
while calling Muslims to stand and expel them from holy lands.  In 1998 bin Laden 
issued a fatwa calling for the death of all Americans.  By 1999, the FBI placed bin Laden 
on its most wanted terrorists list.  After being identified in the USS Cole attack and the 
two embassy bombings in Africa, the U.S. was in the hunt for bin Laden.  However, bin 
Laden evaded several capture or assignation attempts and coordinated the most 
successful terrorist attack on the U.S. on September 11, 2001.188  
G. CONCLUSION 
These eleven individuals, during different times and in different locations 
throughout the world, proved that secular education did not prevent them from becoming 
terrorists.  For some of them education did not matter at all; it was their duty to do so in 
service to their country and/or religion.  Their economic, religious, and social background 
made no difference in their choice of turning to extremist activities.  All the perpetrators 
chose to participate in terrorist activities for various reasons.  
For Mohammed Atta, being in the shadow of his own sisters may have triggered a 
sense of insignificance in his family and becoming a terrorist most likely made up that 
void.  For the female suicide bombers in Palestine, duty to restore the family honor, 
support for the struggle of Palestine, and pure rage and the need to take revenge was the 
motive that drove them to become shahidas.  For Mohammad Dauoud Oudeh, it was 
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making the world know that there was a Palestine and that Palestinians were suffering at 
the hands of the Israelis.  Ali Hassan Salameh might have started his life as a playboy, 
but in the end he believed that his fate was to carry on his father’s legacy and died for it.   
Ted Kaczynski may have had mental issues growing up, but it did not stop him 
from his quest to attack those responsible and used his brilliant mind to not only create 
his weapons of destruction, but to elude capture for years.  Timothy McVeigh’s quest for 
justice was from what he believed was oppression from the Federal government.  His 
Army background and obsessive following of the Turner Diaries as well as surrounding 
himself with people who had negative feelings of the U.S. only helped him channel his 
inner rage with people who would help him carry out his attack in Oklahoma City.  For 
Osama bin Laden, his educated background and very rich family could not curb his 
feelings of jihad against America and creating the most effective terrorist group in the 
world today: the Al-Qaida terrorist network.  Secular education did not stop any of these 
individuals and should not be the main focus of efforts in preventing extremist behavior. 
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IV. THE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO 
AFGHANISTAN, POVERTY STATUS IN AFGHANISTAN, 
PRESENT CONFLICT SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN, AND 
TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN   
In this chapter, the author will illustrate how much economic aid the U.S. has 
contributed to Afghanistan for education and other reconstruction efforts since 2002.  It is 
critical to understand how the resources are divided, and the possible impact of a policy 
that focuses on one aspect of development versus another.  The author will also illustrate 
that while education is one of the major areas of concern for the U.S., vital necessities 
like clean water, health care, food, and most importantly jobs are not receiving the 
funding needed that ensure economic and social future of Afghanistan.  One cannot 
assess education effectiveness when poverty is prevalent throughout a country.  In 
addition to assessment, a policy that focuses on education and employment as ways to 
prevent terrorism ought to also focus on job availability for the educated as well as their 
ability to get to work.  
Access to clean water that can improve the health of the country as well as 
prevent disease, illness, and death of newborns are paramount, along with education and 
increased school enrollment.  These basic necessities that are vital to any society in rural 
and urban areas will make a difference in the long run before education will.  For a 
society to advance itself socially and economically, ensuring access to better health, clean 
water, food, and work opportunities are critical.  Afghanistan has lacked these necessities 
for decades and the current policy does not effectively deal with such concerns. 
This chapter will also illustrate that although the U.S. is sending millions of 
dollars to Afghanistan to improve their way of life, extremism and terrorism continues to 
plague the country.  The U.S. is providing assistance in hopes of destroying Al-Qaida and 
Taliban forces while earning cooperation from the public along with the Afghan 
government in the war on terror.  The reality is that attempts by the U.S. to improve 
Afghanistan through modernization methods such as educational opportunities are not 
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working.  This thesis will illustrate this through macro figures that illustrate a rise in 
terrorism as well as a rise in illegal economic systems through opium production.  
With regards to terrorism, there has been no change in Afghanistan and it appears 
that U.S. military operations in Afghanistan have only galvanized terrorist groups like the 
Taliban and Al-Qaida to continue its operations until the U.S. withdraws.  Meanwhile, 
illegal trade activities continue to thrive in the region.  What has not been discussed is 
where the future educated class is supposed to work in such a setting.  As the Sri Lanka 
case illustrates, disparities between educated communities may lead to violence and 
ethnic conflict.  Case profiles of terrorists presented in Chapter III illustrate that it is the 
educated who are frustrated at the system that in turn lead or follow terrorist 
organizations.  What the uneven policy in the case of Afghanistan implies for the future 
has yet to be effectively addressed. 
A. USAID TO AFGHANISTAN 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how money donated by USAID was utilized in 
Afghanistan from FY 2002–2009.  From FY 2002–2007, Afghanistan received over $5 
billion dollars in aid from the U.S. Out of that $5 billion:  $343 million was for education, 
$422 million for health, and $321 million for economic growth.189  For other programs: 
$53 million was for water, $304 million for agriculture and $0 for cash for work.190  
From FY 2008–2009, the U.S. contributed over $2 billion in economic aid.  Out of that 
$2 billion: $193 million was for education (which was about half of what was contributed 
from FY 2002–2007), $206 million for health (less than half of FY 2002–2007), and 
$247 million for economic growth.191  What makes these numbers worrisome is that 
clean water only received $35 million for FY 2008–2009, agriculture received $186 
million and only $100 million for FY 2009 for cash for work.192  
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$27 $56 $50 $77 $27 $67 $304 5% 
Alternative Development $3 $1 $5 $185 $121 $229 $544 9% 
Roads $51 $142 $354 $276 $250 $365 $1,438 24% 
Power $3 - $77 $286 $66 $195 $626 11% 
Water $2 $1 $27 $21 $1 $2 $53 1% 
Economic Growth* $21 $12 $84 $91 $46 $69 $321 5% 
Cash for Work - - - - - - - 0% 
PRTs (including Civilian 
Assistance Program - Leahy)** 
- $11 $56 $85 $20 $126 $298 5% 
State PRT (ESF) - - - - - - - 0% 
Afghanistan Reconstruction 
Trust Fund (ARTF) 
$41 $40 $93 $103 $50 $38 $365 6% 
National Solidarity Program 
(NSP) 
- - $10 $15 $10 $15 $50 1% 
Support to GIRoA/Cross-
cutting*** 
- - - - - $19 $19 0% 
Democracy/Governance 
(including Civil Society) 
$22 $34 $132 $88 $17 $82 $375 6% 
Elections**** - - - - - $52 $52 1% 
Strategic Communications (ESF) - - - - - - - 0% 
Rule of Law $4 $8 $21 $15 $6 $10 $64 1% 
Education $19 $21 $104 $86 $51 $63 $343 6% 
Health $8 $56 $83 $111 $52 $113 $422 7% 
Program Support $5 $6 $17 $16 $4 $35 $83 1% 
IDPs $108 $23 $10 - - - $141 2% 
Food Assistance $159 $51 $49 $57 $60 - $376 6% 
TOTAL $471 $462 $1,172 $1,511 $779 $1,478 $5,872 100% 
*The FY09 Spring Supplemental request includes $20 million specifically for workforce development. 
**After FY08, PRTs/Stabilization also includes Civilian Assistance Program (Leahy earmarked funds). 
***Before FY06, Support to GIRoA/Cross-cutting is captured under ARTF.  Cross-cutting activities include gender, public  
       outreach/information systems, and evaluation and M&E. 
****Before the 2007 Base, Elections is captured under Democracy/Governance. 




*The FY09 Spring Supplemental request includes $20 million specifically for workforce development. 
**After FY08, PRTs/Stabilization also includes Civilian Assistance Program (Leahy earmarked funds). 
***Before FY06, Support to GIRoA/Cross-cutting is captured under ARTF.  Cross-cutting activities include gender, public  
       outreach/information systems, and evaluation and M&E. 
****Before the 2007 Base, Elections is captured under Democracy/Governance. 














Supplemental Total FY09 % 
Agriculture (including 
Environment) 
$56 - $56 3% $30 - $100 $130 6% 
Alternative 
Development 
$111 $65 $176 11% $62 $38 $65 $165 8% 
Roads $74 $200 $274 17% $68 $61 - $129 6% 
Power $87 $150 $237 15% $69 $65 - $134 6% 
Water $16 - $16 1% $16 $3 - $19 1% 
Economic Growth* $69 $7 $76 5% $49 $37 $85 $171 8% 
Cash for Work - - - 0% - - $100 $100 5% 
PRTs (including 
Civilian Assistance 
Program - Leahy)** 
$55 $60 $115 7% $84 $55 $106 $245 11% 




$20 $50 $70 4% $60 - $90 $150 7% 
National Solidarity 
Program (NSP) 








$29 $114 $143 9% $62 $72 $75 $209 10% 
Elections**** $20 $70 $90 6% $97 $56 $25 $178 8% 
Strategic 
Communications (ESF) 
- - - 0% - - $50 $50 2% 
Rule of Law $6 $25 $31 2% $8 $15 $10 $33 2% 
Education $60 $39 $99 6% $88 $6 - $94 4% 
Health $77 $36 $113 7% $61 $27 $5 $93 4% 
Program Support $16 - $16 1% $29 - $15 $44 2% 
IDPs - - - 0% - - - - 0% 
Food Assistance $10 - $10 1% $47 - - $47 2% 
TOTAL $762 $859 $1,621 100% $838 $455 $861 $2,154 100% 
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Basic necessities, such as clean water, access to health care, funding for 
agriculture, and most of all a steady economy (which could ensure that urban and rural 
Afghans alike can have a chance at having some kind of employment), decreased, while 
the education system of Afghanistan was one of the USAID priorities.  The most 
important issues that needed to be addressed are the present economic and health 
dilemmas that Afghanistan faces.  A country that can provide food and water to remote 
areas for a majority of the population like Afghanistan will be far more beneficial in the 
long run than building schools because one country cannot advance itself without being 
able to sustain its own population. 
B. POVERTY STATUS IN AFGHANISTAN 
Poverty actually kills more Afghans than those who die as a direct result 
of the armed conflict either accidental, nor inevitable; it is both a cause 
and a consequence of a massive human rights deficit. The deficit includes 
widespread impunity and inadequate investment in, and attention to, 
human rights. Patronage, corruption, impunity and over-emphasis on 
short-term goals rather than targeted long-term development are 
exacerbating a situation of dire poverty that is the condition of an 
overwhelming majority of Afghans.  
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
based on an April 2010 report on a 14-province survey.193 
The 2007–2008 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) reported 
that the poverty rate for Afghanistan was 36%, which means that 9 million Afghans were 
not able to meet basic needs, the poor were only able to consume up to 78% of their basic 
needs, although 36% could not meet consumption needs, the probability of many more 
people becoming poor was high.194  With regards to income, the report also showed that 
36% of households rely on farming as their main source of income and more than half of 
those households report that farming is their main source of income are subsistence 
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farmers.195  With regards to employment, more than 48% of employed individuals work 
less than thirty-five hours a week, while child labor is at 8 million Afghan children 
between the ages of six and fifteen who are engaged in some sort of economic activity.196  
Poverty not only affects employment, but makes it nearly impossible to ensure a 
healthy and survivable life for the population.  Afghanistan holds the second highest 
maternal mortality rate, making it the single highest cause of death in the country, and the 
third worst in global ranking for child mortality.197  Drinkable water only reaches out to 
23% of Afghans while 24% of the population who are fifteen years and older can read 
and write.198  Only 12.6% of women are literate, while there is only 20% literacy in rural 
areas; only 6% are literate in nomadic areas which are worse than with neighboring 
countries.199  In 2009, maternal mortality in Afghanistan was 1,600 per 100,000 live 
births, which is five (Pakistan) to fifty times (Uzbekistan) higher than the situation in 
neighboring countries.200 
With regards to food, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 
2010 reported that only 15–20% of the food donated reached the poorest areas.201  One 
village (Badgah) received only forty sacks of wheat for six hundred families and another 
(Kasi) only received only ten sacks for three hundred families.202  The consensus from 
both villages was that the food had been either embezzled or diverted elsewhere.203  
Other stories of frustrated villages throughout Afghanistan share the same situations as 
the ones mentioned above.  In Tirinkot, Uruzgan Province, policemen took a large share 
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of the food aid when those distributing it refused to give a share to policemen out of sheer 
greed.  In the Charsada district of Ghor Province, government officials were found to be 
involved in stealing food aid in 2009; no action was ever taken.204   
Such examples of hoarding by the local police provide evidence that although 
much aid is being directed towards Afghanistan, it is not directed at the right places.  
Besides natural disasters, as well as the present conflict with the U.S., Afghans living in 
poverty are not getting what is necessary to survive.  This is compounded by the absence 
of a system entrusted to ensure the social well being of its people and the government’s 
inability to respond to the population’s needs, especially in times of crisis.205  
The World Food Program summed up the crises in Afghanistan with the 
following:206  
1. Nearly a third of the population (7.4 million people) are unable to get 
enough food to live active, healthy lives.  Another 8.5 million people, or 
37%, are on the borderline of food insecurity.  
2. Around 400,000 people each year are seriously affected by natural 
disasters, such as droughts, floods, earthquakes or extreme weather 
conditions. 
3. While life expectancy has increased slightly to 44.5 years for men and 44 
for women, many of the country’s health indicators are alarming. Along 
with a high infant mortality rate, Afghanistan suffers from one of the 
highest levels of maternal mortality in the world (1,600 deaths per 100,000 
live births).  
4. More than half of children under the age of five are malnourished, and 
micronutrient deficiencies (particularly iodine and iron) are widespread 
(39% are underweight). 
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5. In 2008, Afghanistan was hit by both drought and globally high food 
prices, which saw the price of wheat and wheat products increase 
dramatically across the country. Despite prices beginning to fall in 2009, 
they remain higher than normal. 
6. Insecurity is a major and growing concern. Insurgent activity and military 
operations have affected food security in some regions, undermined 
reconstruction efforts and restricted humanitarian interventions. 
7. Environmental degradation a severe problem. War, uncontrolled grazing, 
pastureland encroachment, illegal logging and the loss of forest and grass 
cover have worsened drought conditions and reduced agricultural 
productivity. 
As long as areas of concern like proper food distribution, access to drinkable 
water, prevention of infant mortality rates, and security for the population that needs the 
food necessary to survive are being ignored, Afghanistan will continue to lose more of its 
population.  Afghanistan needs more than an end to the Taliban and Al-Qaida; it needs to 
find a way to preserve the present population who is struggling to survive today.  No 
school will prevent poverty, nor will it prevent corruption by those who are appointed to 
protect the population.  Focusing on feeding and ensuring the physical well being of the 
population first will empower the population to educate and ensure its advancement and 
survival.  
C. PRESENT CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN 
Tactically, the U.S. has a foothold in areas that are deemed important to the 
mission in Afghanistan.  These gains are also vital to the Afghan government who views 
these areas as necessary for the promotion of democracy and building a prosperous 
country.  However, Figures 3 to 7 show that the conflict has only intensified with no 
signs of ending anytime soon.  Figures 3 and 4 clearly show proof that there has been no 
break in the intensity of fighting in Afghanistan, showing a significant increase in 
2009.207  Figure 5 shows that insurgents continue to have influence throughout the 
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country and its indigenous population, which could aid them in their war against the 
U.S.208  Figures 6 and 7 illustrate poppy cultivation for opium has only increased, from 
which the Taliban is using to their advantage to fund their war against the United States, 
gain trust and gain influence and cooperation from the population.209 
 
 
Figure 3.   Rising Intensity of the Fighting: 2005–2009 
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Figure 5.   Insurgent Influence and Capability by District: 2009 
 
Figure 6.   Going South & Aiding the Taliban: Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends in 




Figure 7.   Taliban Dominates: Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009 (at 
Province Level) 
Figures 3–7 illustrate that the U.S. and present Afghan government are making no 
real gains in areas that it pledged to free of the Taliban.  Afghans in rural areas that don’t 
have access to basic necessities to survive are being influenced by insurgents because the 
insurgents rely on the local population to assist in the illegal economy of opium operated 
to fund their war against the U.S.  While these issues loom throughout the country, 
Afghans struggle to survive every day due to lack of access to the basic needs to sustain 
life.  Unless the U.S. can answer to the needs of the population, the Taliban will gain its 
hold on the people that the U.S. promised to protect and modernize to a stable society. 
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D. TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN 
Figure 8 illustrates that terrorist incidents in Afghanistan have only increased 
since 2002.  In 2002, casualties were at their lowest at seventy-nine.210  However, every 
year after 2002 shows a steady increase to as high as 1,228 in 2008, while dropping 
slightly to 760 in 2009.211  Today, the U.S. is entering its tenth year of the war in 
Afghanistan.  Casualties for both coalition forces and civilians are mounting while 
politicians in Washington D.C. are still searching for a solution as well as a timeline of 
U.S. withdrawal.  The question that needs to be addressed is that if the U.S. defeats the 
Taliban and Al-Qaida forces, will its economic investment of reconstructing Afghanistan 
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Figure 8.   Fatalities Resulting from Selected Terrorist Incidents in Afghanistan   
(Source: RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents) 
 
                                                 
210 RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, ―Fatalities Resulting from Selected Terrorist 
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Although the U.S. has invested billions of dollars in Afghanistan with the hopes 
of improving the lives of its people, poverty continues to plague the countryside.  Lack of 
food and clean water that are not being distributed to areas that are in dire need of it, 
proper health care especially for newborns is not sufficient, lack of a study economy, and 
corruption from government officials makes any hope of progress bleak for the Afghan 
people.  The war is entering its tenth year, with Al-Qaida and Taliban forces continuing 
to stifle U.S. hopes of ending the conflict with its control of the poppy production as well 
as support from rural villages.  With regards to education, the U.S. has invested millions 
to improve the education system of Afghanistan by building more schools and expanding 
education opportunities to females.  However, these efforts did not end the insurgency, 
corruption from government officials, and continued terrorist attacks.  
Economic aid programs in the hopes of promoting peace do not guarantee a 
country free of terrorism.  The U.S. has failed to realize that notion in Afghanistan.  As 
the war continues, civilian deaths continue not by violence or by war, but by poverty due 
to the lack of basic needs for survival.  Even if Al-Qaida and Taliban forces are defeated, 
the U.S. would have to ensure that the people who are responsible for providing for the 
Afghan people will ensure their survival.  Providing millions in economic aid to 
Afghanistan in the hopes of assimilating it to the U.S. vision of modernization cannot 
guarantee it from falling back to an unstable and failed country, leaving the U.S. in 
another political and economic conundrum.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Any country that embarks on a mission of promoting modernization with 
education without providing a larger political economic change is likely to see increased 
discontent.  Education is an important facet for improving a society; however, it cannot 
be the sole answer to prevent or reduce the likelihood of terrorism.  Education in any 
country cannot be used as a measure of success if it cannot provide jobs, which in turn 
will strengthen a country’s economy and self-reliance.  As long as any country cannot 
provide basic necessities such as clean water, food, shelter and access to health care, 
there won’t be enough children to occupy those schools.  As mentioned in chapter IV, the 
U.S. has invested millions of dollars in education efforts.  However, the country is still 
impoverished, government officials are still corrupt, opium is still the economy of choice, 
children are not getting the basic necessities, and the Taliban still exists.  If the U.S. 
wants to have some sense of accomplishment in improving the conditions of Afghanistan, 
it must concentrate on the obvious problems that plague it today.  This chapter will 
provide three insights that were reached in this thesis, and lastly; it also suggests some 
solutions to the problem of violence and terrorism in Afghanistan.  These solutions are 
not meant to alleviate extremism and terrorism in Afghanistan; however, these solutions 
must be put in place in order to ensure that there is a move towards improvement of the 
country and its population. 
A. INSIGHTS 
1. An Educated Country Does Not Mean It Is the Most Civilized 
Country  
Chapter I mentioned American scholars like Fukuyama, Huntington, and Olsen, 
who viewed education as vital to a productive and civilized society.  However, they 
cannot answer how an educated country like the U.S. is riddled with crime and 
lawlessness.  For the U.S. in 2009, the FBI reported that there was a murder every 34.5 
minutes, a rape every six minutes, a robbery every 1.3 minutes, and an aggravated assault 
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every 39.1 seconds.212  Out of 13,687,241 arrests in the U.S. in 2009, 1,319,458, were for 
assault, 1,663,582 were for drug abuse violations, and 1,440,409 were for driving under 
the influence.213  With hate crimes in 2009, there were 7,789 offenses with 8,336 victims 
throughout the U.S.214  It’s sobering how a global superpower like the U.S. that takes 
pride in educating itself cannot solves the growing crime rate in its own backyard.  These 
statistics did not show causal factors as to why those individuals committed those crimes 
and whether that individual was from an educated family.  However, these statistics 
prove that even a powerful country like the U.S. is not free from crime or terrorism from 
within. 
2. Isolating a Minority Will Lead to Conflict and Dire Consequences 
In this thesis, the author also illustrated a case where education policy became a 
point of contention between ethnic groups leading to the marginalization of the Tamil 
minority population and eventually a civil war.  The war occurred between two groups: 
one that was seen as more educated, and the second who felt marginalized. The war, 
which lasted over two decades, could have been prevented if there had been more 
opportunities for the Sinhalese who felt that the Tamils got more than their share of the 
resources because of their education. Under the British, the Tamil population along with 
some Sinhalese elite was well educated and formed a dominant group.  Feeling 
marginalized, the rural Sinhalese sought to cut off educational and job opportunities for 
the Tamils.  The reduced upward mobility for the Tamils led to an educated Tamil class 
revolting against the Sinhalese that was marginalizing them.  Although the LTTE was the 
violent result of that marginalization, it provides evidence that isolating a minority will 
only lead to dissention, anger, and then violence.  The community’s education level did 
not play a role in reducing terrorism in this case. 
                                                 
212 U.S. Department of Justice (FBI), ―Crime Clock Statistics,‖ U.S. Department of Justice, 
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/about/crime_clock.html (accessed April 22, 2011). 
213 U.S. Department of Justice (FBI), ―Estimated Number of Arrests United States, 2009,‖ U.S. 
Department of Justice, http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_29.html (accessed April 22, 2011). 
214 U.S. Department of Justice (FBI), ―Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders by Bias 
Motivation, 2009,‖ U.S. Department of Justice, http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2009/data/table_01.html 
(accessed April 22, 2011). 
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3. Lack of Education Is Not the Lone Factor for Individuals Committing 
Terrorist Acts 
Throughout this thesis, each chapter illustrated that a level of education will not 
prevent nor reduce the likelihood of terrorism.  The eleven individuals illustrated in 
Chapter III are good examples of how individuals from different socioeconomic and 
educational backgrounds choose to be terrorists.  Lack of education was not a casual 
factor in their rationale. This discredits the belief that education will produce a rational 
and law abiding citizen.  What these individual cases prove is that a level of education 
does not prevent terrorism.  Throughout history, there have been terrorist acts where 
perpetrators were not poor or uneducated, or solely raised with extremist ideology 
education from a madrasa as several of these policies not being implemented suggest. 
B. WHAT REALLY NEEDS TO BE DONE IN AFGHANISTAN 
As the war in Afghanistan is entering its tenth year, the Taliban has not been 
defeated, and in some regions has grown in popularity.  Meanwhile, poverty and 
lawlessness continue to plague the countryside.  Shortages of food, drinking water and 
access to health care continue to plague the Afghan population. Unemployment will not 
decrease unless there are programs in place to ensure the economic and social growth of 
Afghanistan.  These programs should not be mistaken with the War on Terror.  However, 
these programs are the easiest and most effective way of measuring success for the U.S. 
goals of improving Afghanistan.  A newly built school means nothing if the children that 
are meant to occupy it are healthy and have access to basic necessities to sustain them to 
attend school.  The U.S. needs to reevaluate how focusing on other programs outside of 
just education may be more cost effective in the long run  The following proposals must 
be put in place in order to give Afghanistan a chance while preventing its continual 
downward spiral.  These proposals may not make Afghanistan’s education rank above 
world standards, but these proposals will ensure the survivability of a population in need 
of preserving its future.   
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1. Make Basic Necessities for Survival the Priority, Not a Priority 
Basic necessities that include food, water, shelter, and availability of medical care 
must be the focal point in Afghanistan.  Success will not be measured by ensuring that 
the indigenous population will continue to have the basic necessities for survival, 
especially when the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan.  USAID has given billions of 
dollars in economic aid to ensure the recovery and reconstruction efforts are underway as 
was shown in Chapter IV.  However, prioritizing what will ensure survival for the 
indigenous population should be paramount. 
With regards to food, The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) 
launched a groundbreaking food voucher project in eastern Afghanistan by distributing 
monthly food vouchers to about 1,500 families in the eastern city of Jalalabad in April 
2011.215  The program not only focuses on the poor, but also aims to boast the local 
economy in Afghan cities.  However, this does not account for the over seven million 
people that are unable to have access to those programs.  Although the WFP announced 
that there was a voucher program, it also identified a funding shortfall of $257 million 
American dollars for food assistance on April 15, 2011.216  With a lack of funds, a 
critical break in wheat (which is the primary food source in Afghanistan) is expected to 
occur in June, affecting millions of Afghans currently being assisted by WFP and 
partners.217  Voucher programs for food in Jalalabad may be a great start; but only 1,500 
families is nowhere near close enough to the seven million who need food now. 
Access to clean water means prevention of diseases or outbreaks.  It is a fact (by 
USAID findings) that diarrhea remains a serious health threat to Afghan children under 
five years of age.  Most of the cases are caused by poor hygiene, sanitation, and lack of 
clean drinking water.  USAID implemented a Community Led-Total Sanitation (CLTS) 
                                                 
215 World Food Programme, ―WFP Launches Food Voucher Project in Jalalabad,‖ 
http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/wfp-launches-food-voucher-project-jalalabad (accessed April 27, 
2011). 
216 World Food Programme, ―Funding Shortfall Threatens Food Assistance to Millions of Poor 
Afghans,‖ http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/funding-shortfall-threatens-food-assistance-millions-
poor-afghans (accessed April 27, 2011). 
217 Ibid. 
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approach in Chenar-e-Gunjishkan of Kalafgan District in Takhar Province, which 
educates the inhabitants to take preventative measures in ensuring that waterborne 
illnesses will not affect their district as well as access to clean water in March 2011.218  
This is a good start that not only improves sanitation and hygiene for that district, but 
increases the likelihood of children under five living through early infancy.  Like any 
program for a population that lives in rural areas, improving the water system will take 
time, money, and most of the entire infrastructure necessary to implement and ensure its 
success. 
In 2008, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) reported 
that 4,369,086 moved to Afghanistan from Iran, Pakistan, and other countries.219  All of 
the refuges believed that shelter was the most important need for integration because 
much of the infrastructure was destroyed, leaving many to move in with friends or family 
creating a crowded and adverse living condition.  The UNHCR created about 180,000 
shelters to accommodate refuges in need by 2009; however, those shelters only covered 
25% of the over four million who have migrated to Afghanistan.220  It must be noted that 
these figures do not address the local population, who also don’t have adequate shelter to 
accommodate their families.  Access to shelter will continue to be a major concern for the 
local population as well as the thousands moving to Afghanistan from other countries. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) gave the following summation regarding 
Afghanistan’s health situation:  
After 23 years of conflict and political instability, a collapsed economy, 
and three years of severe drought, Afghanistan’s health system is among 
the very poorest in the world. Obtaining the most basic of necessities—
food, shelter and clothing—is a constant struggle. Such exposure 
intensifies an already poor health situation, with acute respiratory 
illnesses, diarrheal diseases, and malnutrition killing and weakening the 
                                                 
218 USAID, ―Improved Hygiene and Sanitation Reduces Diarrheal Diseases through the SWSS 
Project, USAID is Implementing a Community Led-Total Sanitation Approach in Kalafgan District,‖ 
http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Article/2156/Improved_Hygiene_and_Sanitation_Reduces_Diarrhe
al_Diseases (accessed April 27, 2011). 
219 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ―Shelter,‖ 
http://www.unhcr.org/49ba2e9116.html (accessed April 27, 2011), 1. 
220 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ―Shelter.‖ 
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children of Afghanistan. There is a critical shortage of health care workers 
at every level.  Healthcare facilities are in urgent need of restoration. 
There are inadequate supplies of medicines, vaccines, equipment, and fuel.  
An estimated 6 million people have no access or insufficient access to 
health care.221 
Besides being one of the lowest ranked in the world in life expectancy, the WHO 
identified that the lack of physical infrastructure (including proper housing, accessible 
rural roads, communication) impedes the improvement of health.  It also noted that the 
low status of women, limited access to clean water, proper sanitation, extremely poor 
hygiene and environmental health shortcomings contribute to the high infant and child 
mortality rates.222  With the growing refugee population, these issues will only get worse 
if these shortfalls are not addressed within the next five years.  It is mystifying to think 
that the government of Afghanistan only allocated 5.2% of their GDP towards health 
when nearly 80% of their population lived in rural areas in 2008.223   
The basic necessities mentioned above should be the primary focus.  There have 
been programs set in place to address these issues; however, only limited progress has 
been made and the population of Afghanistan is increasing due to migration from other 
countries.  The government of Afghanistan (with oversight by the U.S.) must first make 
all efforts necessary to ensure that basic necessities are met for the entire Afghan 
population.  Second, Afghanistan must close its borders in order to care for its present 
population and if not, immediately increase its GDP allocation to facilitate a larger 
population that it must care for.  Lastly, the U.S. must convene a congressional review as 
to where all its funding is being spent by the government of Afghanistan as well as a 
restructure of what programs that the U.S. is willing to continue to support.  The U.S. and 
the government of Afghanistan must prioritize immediately to what is more important to 
the Afghan people: building more schools or ensuring their survivability. 
                                                 
221 World Health Organization, “Health in Afghanistan Situation Analysis,‖ 
www.who.int/disasters/repo/7543.doc (accessed April 27, 2011), 1. 
222 World Health Organization, ―Country Cooperation Strategy at a Glance; Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan,‖ http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccsbrief_afg_en.pdf (accessed April 
27, 2011), 1. 
223 World Health Organization, ―Country Cooperation Strategy at a Glance.‖ 
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2. Increase Vocational Training While, Improving the Education System 
The World Bank reported that 6.2 million students attend grades 1–12; the largest 
figure in the history of Afghanistan with 2.2 million students being girls, which has 
exceeded the pre-Taliban period.224  Areas of concern are improving critical areas of 
learning including literacy and numeric skills, problem solving, team building, critical 
thinking, and effective communication among the Afghan population.225  USAID boasts 
that it has printed more than 75.6 million textbooks, supported 43,800 students annually 
in remote community-based schools, trained nearly 10,500 teachers in an accelerated 
learning program and more than 2,600 university professors on modern teaching 
methods, and built or refurbished more than 680 schools in Afghanistan as of June 
2010.226  These figures may show signs of progress; however, the real key is focusing on 
the future employment for students enrolled in those schools as well as adult programs 
that are in place throughout the rural and urban areas.  With a majority of the population 
depending on farming as their livelihood, the focus should be on building a better 
connection between the rural and urban communities to enhance and improve the 
economy.  The continued presence of opium trade continues to present a challenge which 
education does not solve.  
For 2007–2008, Opium sales in Afghanistan produced $10.2 billion U.S. dollars, 
which equated to 75% of its GDP.   Opium fulfils two important roles in the Afghan 
economy: it produces the largest export profits and constitutes a major source of rural 
income.227  Although only 10% of Afghanistan’s twenty-five million inhabitants live on 
poppy cultivation, it translates to 2.38 million farmers, including their family 
                                                 
224 World Bank, ―Education in Afghanistan,‖ 
http://www.worldbank.org.af/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANE
XTN/0,,contentMDK:21682753~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:305985,00.html (accessed 
April 29, 2011). 
225 Ibid. 
226 USAID, ―Education Increasing Access to Quality Education and Suitable Learning Environments,‖ 
http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/programs/education#Tab=Description (accessed April 29, 2011). 
227 Citha D. Maass, ―Afghanistan’s Drug Career — Evolution from a War Economy to a Drug 
Economy,‖ German Institute for International and Security Affairs (2011): 23–24. 
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members.228  There appears to be no slow down of the cultivation and distribution of 
opium throughout Afghanistan.  With the high payout rates, rural farmers will continue to 
use this as their primary source of income, especially if their areas are lacking in basic 
necessities as well as access to other employment opportunities besides farming.  For the 
average Afghan, dropping out of school to participate in the opium trade means providing 
food, shelter, and medical care for their families.  Unless there are programs that can 
connect the rural with the urban centers for jobs and economic growth, the dependence 
on opium for income will continue to be the means of survival for the rural population.  
Education leading to no jobs does not solve the problem that the economy still relies on 
illicit trade to a large extent. 
There appears to be some recognition of the disconnect between focusing on 
enrollment vis-a-vis the type of jobs available. The World Bank in Afghanistan is in the 
process of designing a project on vocational education and training (VET) driven by the 
following three present economic realities:   
 Youth unemployment and underemployment pose both developmental and 
security problems;  
 Workers from neighboring countries are largely meeting the country’s 
demand for skilled labor, which reduces the employment prospects for 
Afghan citizens;  
 The country’s success in getting children back into school has produced a 
large number of students with few skills for integration into the labor 
market.229   
These three realities show the importance of supporting programs like VET and 
not the present goal of just ensuring higher enrollment in schools.  The U.S. needs to 
understand the long-term economic gains by investing in finding a healthy balance 
between literacy, school enrollment, and future economic growth by better skilled 
Afghans, not hired labor from other countries. 
                                                 
228 Maas, ―Afghanistan’s Drug Career,‖ 23. 
229 World Bank, ―Afghanistan Skills Training,‖ 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:22023
961~menuPK:2246552~pagePK:2865106~piPK:2865128~theSitePK:223547,00.html (accessed May 1, 
2011). 
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One can argue that USAID already has vocational programs like Learning for 
Community Empowerment Program (LCEP-2)230 and Skills Training for Afghan Youth 
(STAY)231 underway since 2008 and 2010, respectively.  However, both programs are 
only in place until 2013.232  These programs must be a long-term investment, not a 
program that needs to be re-evaluated by 2013.  The measure of success is determined on 
how much time, and yes, economic risk in ensuring that those involved in programs like 
LCEP-2 and STAY can be successful long after their training in those programs.  There is 
no denying that programs like the ones mentioned above are already in place; however, 
there needs to be a concerted effort in supporting those programs that could bolster the 
workforce in Afghanistan, which will in turn bolster its economy. 
Increasing vocational training to bolster the workforce and economic base in 
Afghanistan is a long-term and expensive investment.  Some of the risks of continuing 
vocational training include: the opium trade will continue to be the source of income, 
those living in rural areas will only want to use agriculture as a means of income well as 
survival, and little interest to connect with the urban cities.  The gains that it can give to 
the Afghan population are: bolstering the workforce throughout all of Afghanistan (rural 
and urban), increase trade and commerce with other countries, and looking to other forms 
of income outside the illicit growth and distribution of opium.  Vocational programs like 
LCEP-2 and STAY target the 80% of Afghans who live in rural areas and it will take 
years to assess any success.  However, the reality is clear: unemployment is at its highest 
 
 
                                                 
230 LCEP-2 works in twenty provinces across Afghanistan and has already enrolled 167,000 
community members (60% are female). A recent evaluation documented the difficulty of developing viable 
economic activities without strong local businesses, and the revised project will focus on literacy and 
livelihood training, while relying more upon networking and other entities for business and micro-
enterprise development. 
231 The STAY project represents a collaboration of the USAID Education and Economic Growth 
teams; it addresses education and workforce development needs for youth ages 15 to 25. The project 
supports vocational training schools in two provinces, and provides small grants that target education and 
life skills training for highly vulnerable, out of school, illiterate youth. The vocational school for continues 
USAID’s support to the Afghanistan Technical Vocational Institute, a coeducational vocational school that 
providing a two-year postsecondary program in fields needed to support Afghanistan’s economic growth. 
232 USAID, Education Increasing Access to Quality Education and Suitable Learning Environments. 
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in Afghanistan, jobs are being taken by people from other countries and, even with a high 
enrollment of students in schools, many are not given the tools necessary to compete in 
the current Afghan job market.   
3. Immediately Restructure Funding for Afghanistan 
There is no doubt that after military kinetic operations conclude in Afghanistan 
the U.S. will continue to provide economic support for at least another ten years.  Until 
now, there has been no sign of progress from Afghanistan.  As mentioned earlier, from 
2002–2009, funding from just USAID alone to Afghanistan totaled more than 
$9 billion.233  As of now, unemployment, poverty, illegal drug trade, lack of medical 
care, high infant mortality, and lack of a competent government to provide security and 
the basic needs to its people still continue to plague Afghanistan.  The U.S. has overseen 
all the operations that the government and the people of Afghanistan have undertaken to 
make it a better country.  However, there have been no significant changes or 
improvement to their present situation.  The U.S. understands the political and military 
importance that Afghanistan holds in the region; however, it needs to draw the line on 
how taxpayer dollars are spent as well as American lives lost in this war.  With the 
present administration in Washington, there will not be a push to stop all economic 
funding to Afghanistan; however, the following measures must be taken soon to ensure 
that U.S. aid is better utilized to make Afghanistan a better partner as well as a country 
that can be free of U.S. dependency in the near future. 
First, priority must be focused on its people by ensuring that improving the 
infrastructure can provide the basic necessities for the average Afghan to survive.  With a 
better infrastructure, clean water means a higher probability of healthier children who can 
go to school, elimination of non-communicable diseases, homes that are habitable, and 
centers that can provide better health care.   
 
                                                 
233 USAID, ―Budget and Obligations,‖ http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/about/budget (accessed May 1, 
2011). 
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Second, feeding a country means having the right personnel that can distribute it 
to the people.  If Afghanistan continues to allow corrupt government and law 
enforcement personnel have possession of food distribution, rural inhabitants will 
continue to be disgruntled, leaving them no choice but to depend on groups like the 
Taliban to support them while supporting terrorist operations.  Forty-seven million 
dollars from 2008–2009 from USAID234 was not enough for the seven million who were 
without food, and more will continue to go hungry as more people from other countries 
continue to migrate to Afghanistan.  This area of concern needs to be rectified sooner 
than later.  
Third, the goal of the U.S. is to make Afghanistan self-reliant, not a country that 
is provided aid by the U.S. in its war against Al-Qaida.  There needs to be a clear 
message given to Afghan government that the U.S. will provide the means necessary to 
ensure that the Afghan people will have the means and the training necessary to make 
itself a country that can connect the rural and urban areas for social and economic 
growth.  Unless the Afghan government does not realize that aid can and will be limited, 
especially when the U.S. does not deem the country tactically and economically 
important, Afghanistan will continue to be dependent on U.S. aid and will continue its 
downward spiral as one of the poorest and unproductive countries in the world. 
Many would argue that restructuring the budget to three priorities would be next 
to impossible to achieve.  However, the U.S. has provided more than its share to 
Afghanistan and it is now time for Afghanistan to become self-reliant.  The U.S. has done 
enough and the cost has been high, both with tax-payer money and the lives of its own 
military personnel.  It is true that these priorities will be a long-term solution; however, it 
needs to start now, not after the next election.  By restructuring the priority of funding to 
Afghanistan, the U.S. can focus on the real needs for Afghanistan, which will hopefully 
mean a successful conclusion to this present operation.  The U.S. mission for Afghanistan 
must be focused on finding a solution for long term economic and social development. 
 
                                                 
234 USAID, ―Budget and Obligations.‖ 
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Unless it finds a way to structure its economic and military support to Afghanistan, the 
U.S. will find itself in a long term commitment with a country that will drain U.S. aid as 
well as the lives of its own citizens.  
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